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ABSTRACT 
A number of recent studies have concluded that the United States is vulnerable to 
attack from terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Depending on 
the circumstances, a terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons could cause 
more destruction and casualties than one with other types ofWMD. Four strategies for 
improving U.S. capabilities to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are often 
proposed: (1) to improve intelligence capabilities to gain better knowledge of terrorist 
intentions and capabilities; (2) to improve security measures in nuclear facilities 
throughout the former Soviet Union (FSU) and elsewhere, so terrorists will have more 
difficulty acquiring nuclear materials; (3) to deter terrorists from conducting nuclear or 
radiological attacks, particularly in the United States; and (4) to improve America's 
response capabilities to terrorists that have already acquired nuclear or radiological 
weapons. This thesis evaluates current U.S. capabilities and activities in each of these 
areas and provides recommendations for improving America's counter-terrorism 
strategies to defend against terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As the United States enters the twenty-first century, it must be prepared to meet 
the challenge of terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. Top-level 
government and military leaders have gone on the record to warn America of the 
possibility of terrorists using nuclear or radiological weapons in an attack against the 
United States. The current Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Retired. Marine .. 
Corps General Anthony Zinni, among others, have publicly expressed their judgments 
that terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will attack America in the 
near future. 
Recent studies sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), the Director of Central Intelligence, and a joint Stanford University-Harvard 
University group explored the threat posed by terrorist groups and WMD. These studies 
concluded that the United States must improve its capability to defend against a terrorist 
attack with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
This thesis examines four strategies commonly recommended as defenses against 
terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. Specifically, this thesis evaluates 
the probable effectiveness of current intelligence, prevention, deterrence, and crisis 
management capabilities in protecting the United States from an attack by a terrorist 
group using nuclear or radiological weapons. The thesis focuses on nuclear and 
radiological weapons rather than other types ofWMD due to the unique effects of these 
weapons. If a successful attack occurred, the consequence management challenges and 
procedures could be more complex with nuclear materials than with other types ofWMD. 
ix 
Identifying terrorist groups that might desire to acquire and use nuclear or 
radiological weapons is an important step in a strategy designed to prevent this type of 
terrorist attack. Attempting to understand and predict the actions of terrorist groups is 
difficult, so concentrating efforts only against those few terrorist groups that possess both 
the motivation and realistic capability to obtain nuclear materials may be the key to 
interdicting such efforts. Though there are many terrorist groups, only,,a few. have the ... 
motivation and capabilities needed to use nuclear or radiological weapons. The United 
States must identify the terrorist groups that pose a genuine threat of acquiring nuclear or 
radiological weapons. The United States must then improve intelligence efforts against 
these terrorists, specifically in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT). 
Programs aimed at securing nuclear materials and interdicting smuggling routes 
could disrupt a terrorists' attempts to use nuclear or radiological weapons to attack the 
United States. The United States must improve efforts to secure nuclear materials, to 
employ former Soviet Union (FSU) nuclear scientists, and to improve smuggling 
interdiction capabilities. To meet these proliferation challenges, the United States 
supports a number of programs, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program, the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A), the 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), the Initiatives for Proliferation 
Protection (IPP), the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), and the Second Line ofDefense 
(SLD) programs. Each of these programs is briefly evaluated for its potential in stopping 
terrorist groups fron:t acquiring nuclear materials. 
Deterrence is another strategy commonly recommended to protect against 
terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. The thesis examines two 
X 
possibilities for deterring nuclear or radiological terrorism. First, the United States could 
use classic deterrence by threatening unacceptable punishment against terrorist groups 
and the states that support terrorism. Second, the United States could use modified 
deterrence strategies, such as denying terrorists the ability to easily carry out a nuclear or 
radiological attack, or increasing law enforcement efforts against traffickers in nuclear 
materials. By using both classic and modified deterrence strategies, the United States 
may have a better chance of influencing the behavior of terrorists. 
Despite its efforts to deny terrorists the ability to use nuclear or radiological 
weapons, the United States must still be prepared to combat terrorists armed with such 
weapons. The United States must improve its capability to intercept nuclear or 
radiological weapons and to respond to a successful attack. New technologies coupled 
with improvements in current emergency response teams may provide the United States 
the ability to detect and locate nuclear or radiological weapons assembled in (or 
smuggled into) the United States. Improvements also are required for emergency 
response units at all government levels, starting with the plan that has been promulgated 
to organize emergency response efforts. 
The United States faces a threat from nuclear and radiological terrorism, and 
should improve its capability to defend itself from this threat. The United States cannot 
afford to continue hoping that terrorists will not use nuclear or radiological weapons; it 
must devise strategies against such terrorists. This thesis examines four possible 
strategies that could improve U.S. counter-terrorism capabilities. The United States 
should focus resources primarily in the areas that will offer the greatest improvements in 
defending against terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. Though better 
xi 
capabilities in any of the four strategies examined in this thesis would enhance counter-
terrorism efforts, improved intelligence and response capabilities could offer the most 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides an evaluation of United States capabilities to counter 
terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. The main question this thesis 
addresses is whether the various steps the United States is currently taking can counter a 
terrorist group that may attempt to use nuclear or radiological weapons in an attack 
against the United States. The thesis evaluates whether the four most often recommended .. , 
strategies provide adequate protection and offers recommendations for improvements to 
those strategies. 
Each chapter of this thesis examines one ofthe strategies often recommended as 
defense against a nuclear-armed terrorist group. The second chapter focuses on efforts to 
identify terrorist groups that pose a genuine threat to acquire nuclear materials for use in 
an attack. The third chapter evaluates efforts to secure nuclear material and to provide 
opportunities for employment for nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
to enable them to avoid seeking employment from terrorist groups. The fourth chapter 
focuses on possible efforts to deter terrorist groups and the states that may sponsor them. 
Finally, the fifth chapter evaluates current capabilities to respond to a terrorist group that 
has already obtained a nucle~ or radiological weapon. 
The problem the United States faces is that some terrorist groups may already be 
able to acquire nuclear materials, but there is no coherent U.S. strategy in place to stop 
terrorist groups from using nuclear materials in an attack. The most difficult task in 
obtaining a nuclear or radiological weapon is acquiring the required nuclear materials 
since the knowledge ofhow to build a weapon is widely available throughout the world. 
1 
There is evidence that terrorist groups can gain obtain nuclear materials, and some 
analysts predict that these materials could become more available in the future. 
Defending against terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons is 
important because they could cause grave and enduring damage. The United States faces 
many security challenges, however, and has a limited amount of resources to use in 
combating this threat. The threat of a terrorist group using nuclear materials in an .attack , 
against the United States must be taken seriously and the United States must improve its 
capability to defend itself in a timely fashion against this threat. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
A radiological weapon causes contamination with radioactive materials, including 
those used in medicine and commerce. Nuclear weapons involve an explosion caused by 
the chain reaction created by fissionable materials. 1 A radiological weapon would 
probably couple radioactive materials with conventional explosives to spread the 
radioactivity, whereas a nuclear weapon would use either plutonium or highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) to create a fission or fusion explosion. Throughout the remainder of this 
thesis the term nuclear materials refers to the materials required for a radiological or 
nuclear weapon. 
A terrorist group is any sub-national organization (aside from criminal gangs or 
similar groups that pursue personal enrichment) that uses violence to achieve its 
objectives. Numerous organizations fit this description, regardless of their political, 
religious, or social ideology. Also included in this category are racial supremacists and 
1 Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 4. 
2 
"doomsday cults" that desire to destroy most of the human race and reconstruct a new 
society based on their beliefs. 
B. BASIS FOR STUDY 
In 1996 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted an 
exercise named Wild Atom designed to evaluate the capability of the United States to 
defend itself against a terrorist group armed with a nuclear device. After two days of 
observing participants game a terrorist attack, CSIS analysts concluded that successful 
interdiction against a nuclear-armed terrorist group would be "extremely difficult" and 
that "in the end, nothing was decided or even suggested that would have prevented a 
crude nuclear device from arriving into the United States in two days time."2 In June of 
the same year, the Director of Central Intelligence chartered a study to assess the threat 
posed by terrorist groups using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The CIA-
commissioned study concluded that terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
constitute the threat for which the nation is least prepared, and emphasized that an end-to-
end systematic strategy would be the best defense to counter such a threat.3 
In 1998 the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, ajoint venture 
dedicated to studying post-Cold War defense challenges, explored the threat posed by 
terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This study's conclusions 
revealed a lack of confidence in U.S. preparations to address catastrophic terrorism 
utilizing weapons of mass destruction or intensive cyber assault.4 The study 
2 Center For Strategic and International Studies, Global Organization Crime Porject, Wild Atom: Nuclear 
Terrorism (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). 40. 
3 
"A National Strategy Against Nuclear Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction." [report on-line]; 
available from http://www.llnl.gov/str/Imbro.htrnl. 
4 Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Phillip D. Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a 
National Policy" [report on-line] available from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/visions/gtrept.htm. 
3 
recommended intelligence, prevention, deterrence, and crisis management as the pillars 
of a strategy against catastrophic terrorism. These studies suggest that there is a threat of 
terrorist groups possibly attacking the United States with nuclear or radiological weapons 
and that the United States is not prepared to defend itself against such an attack. 
These studies provided the motivation for this thesis. Using the conclusions and 
recommendations of these studies as a starting point, this thesis evaluates .the probable 
effectiveness of current intelligence, prevention, deterrence, and crisis management 
capabilities in protecting the United States against an attack by a terrorist group using 
nuclear or radiological weapons. This thesis focuses on nuclear and radiological 
weapons rather than other types ofWMD due to the unique effects of these weapons. 
Though an attack with any type ofWMD would be horrible, nuclear and radiological 
weapons present unique challenges both in acquisition prevention and crisis response. 
Nuclear materials are not as readily available as chemical or biological agents, so there is 
a much greater potential for preventing nuclear materials from reaching terrorist 
organizations. If a successful attack occurred, the consequence management procedures 
could be more complex with nuclear materials than with other types ofWMD, depending 
on the specific circumstance.s. 
The United States may be faced with the threat of a terrorist organization armed 
with nuclear materials. The United States must have the capability to deny terrorists the 
opportunity to use nuclear or radiological weapons in an attack. This thesis explores the 
four previously mentioned strategies for countering this threat. If the United States can 
identify the terrorist groups that pose a genuine threat of acquiring nuclear materials, 
4 
improve the security of those materials, deter terrorist groups from using nuclear 
materials, and improve response capabilities, its security will be greatly enhanced. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
This thesis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of present United States 
capabilities to defend against terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. It 
examines the previously mentioned strategies and evaluates their strengths .and 
shortcomings. The thesis relies on a qualitative analysis of primary sources, including 
books, journal articles, congressional testimony, government publications, and 
interviews. In some cases, the thesis draws on analyses and opinions of experts found in 
secondary sources to provide additional insight. 
The second chapter of this thesis evaluates the ability of intelligence agencies to 
identify terrorist groups that may pose a genuine threat of acquiring nuclear materials. 
The United States does not possess the resources to take preventive action against every 
single terrorist organization. There are simply too many organizations in existence, the 
vast majority of which either would not or could not gain access to nuclear materials. If 
the United States could identify the few terrorist groups that pose a nuclear or 
radiological threat, it could focus its interdiction efforts against them. The thesis 
recommends improving human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and revising national 
counter-terrorism policy to improve the intelligence community's ability to determine 
terrorist motivations and capabilities. 
Chapter III focuses on efforts to keep nuclear materials and scientists out of the 
hands of terrorist organizations. Terrorists with access to the internet or a library can 
obtain detailed plans on how to build their own primitive nuclear or radiological bombs. 
5 
Acquiring nuclear materials is far more difficult, though by no means impossible. Many 
reports of nuclear materials smuggling and of nuclear scientists leaving the former Soviet 
Union have surfaced over the last ten years. Chapter III evaluates the current efforts by 
the United States to improve the security of nuclear materials in the FSU and to keep 
former Soviet scientists employed in government facilities. 
Chapter N of this thesis evaluates prospects for deterring terrorist grQups from 
using nuclear or radiological weapons against the United States. The United States could 
attempt to use the classic punitive deterrence approach (that is a threat of retaliation) 
against both the terrorists and any nation-states sponsoring them. Using threats of 
punishment against terrorist groups may be very difficult, so this thesis investigates the 
possibility of using forms of deterrence other than solely the threat of retaliation. 
In view ofthe potential failure of prevention efforts, the United States must be 
prepared to defend against nuclear-armed terrorist groups. Chapter V evaluates current 
U.S. capabilities to interdict terrorist groups already in possession of nuclear or 
radiological weapons and to respond to such attacks. The thesis evaluates the potential 
for U.S. response teams to intercept a nuclear or radiological weapon before it is used in 
an attack. The chapter concludes with recommendations to improve current response 
capabilities. 
The thesis concludes with a short chapter recommending the adoption of a single 
overall strategy integrating all these efforts under the responsibility of a single 
government department. Currently the United States is not ready to meet the threat posed 
by a terrorist group armed with a nuclear or radiological weapon, and it must adopt a 
strategy to counter this threat. Defending the United States from terrorists armed with a 
6 
nuclear or radiological weapon should not be based upon ad hoc decisions in the midst of 
a crisis. The United States should therefore adopt a more comprehensive strategy against 
terrorist groups seeking to use nuclear materials in an attack. 
This thesis is based on the assumption that at some point terrorist groups will try 
to use a nuclear or radiological weapon. Some terrorism experts have argued that 
terrorists could not or would not use radiological or nuclear weapons, and that attempts to. 
defend against such an attack are a waste of resources. The thesis is based on the 
assumption that, even though most terrorist groups would not use such weapons, the past 
ten years have witnessed new types of terrorists whose actions do not conform to 
historical patterns. Simply because no terrorist group has to date attempted to attack the 
United States with nuclear materials does not mean that terrorists may not attempt to use 
these types of weapons in the future. 
7 
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II. IDENTIFYING TERRORIST GROUPS THAT MIGHT ACQUIRE 
NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
Identifying terrorist groups that might desire to acquire and use nuclear or 
radiological weapons is an important first step in a strategy designed to prevent a nuclear 
terrorist attack. Attempting to understand and predict the actions of terrorist groups is 
very difficult, so concentrating efforts only on those few terrorist groups that possess both 
the motivation and realistic capability to obtain nuclear material may be the key to 
interdicting such efforts. As Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, stated in a hearing on the U.S. counter-terrorism policy: 
In order to fight this war, we need to have an assessment of the magnitude 
ofthe anticipated threat from international terrorists to U.S. interests, 
persons, and property both at home and abroad. We need to determine the 
composition of the major terrorist organizations and their leadership. 
Additionally, it is crucial that we maximize the development of 
information relating to ... their intent or capabilities to access weapons of 
mass destruction, which increasingly seem to be of great concern. 
Without an adequate assessment of the threat, it is impossible to have a 
functioning strategy to counter that threat. 5 
The effects of nuclear and radiological weapons are so horrific that they do not 
suit the purposes of most terrorist groups. In addition, nuclear materials are not easy to 
obtain and many terrorist groups do not possess the financial and technical resources 
required for these types of weapons. Understanding the motivations and capabilities of 
the few terrorist groups that could acquire nuclear materials will assist in defining a 
defense strategy by limiting necessary counter-terrorism and interdiction efforts. 
A. NUCLEAR USE MOTIVATIONS 
Identifying terrorist groups that desire to use nuclear or radiological weapons is 
5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy, 105th Cong., 2"d sess., 
3 September 1998, 2. 
9 
difficult since there are few precedents for terrorists attempting to use these weapons. On 
23 November 1995, Russian authorities discovered that a Chechen guerilla leader, 
Shamyl Basayev, had placed a thirty-two kilogram case of caesium that emitted 310 
times the normal amount of radioactivity in Moscow's Ismailovo Park.6 The terrorist 
group Aum Shinrikyo also entertained visions of using nuclear weapons to achieve its 
goals, but fortunately was not able to succeed in its attempts to acquire nuclear materials. 
These examples illustrate that there are some groups that desire to use nuclear materials 
in a terrorist attack. Two types of terrorist groups may be more likely to desire nuclear 
materials and must therefore be closely monitored: (a) religious terrorists and (b) 
supremacists and "doomsday" cults. 
1. Religious Terrorism 
Religious terrorists could find the use of nuclear materials in an attack attractive 
because they are often not concerned about the public's perception of the attack. Most 
secular terrorists use violence as a means to send a message to a certain target audience, 
whereas religiously motivated terrorists may only be concerned with how their actions 
are judged by what they consider to be divine authority. Whereas usually the symbolic 
and audience-oriented aspects of terrorism are separate, in the case of religious-inspired 
violence the two are synonymous. The need to gear action to what the terrorist believes 
the human audience considers appropriate is therefore removed as a constraining 
influence in religious terror. This clearly increases the possibility that religion could be 
used as a justification for nuclear terrorism. 7 
6 Gavin Cameron, "Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?'' Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 9 (September 1, 
1996): 422. 
7 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), 89. 
10 
Religious terrorists also seem to view the world through a black and white 
paradigm, dividing the world into people that are either saved or condemned. The 
struggle is often perceived as an all-out fight between good and evil, believer and non-
believer, justice and injustice, order and chaos. This type of outlook is critical 
in justifying violence generally; but, as with secular terrorism, it can also be used to 
justify great acts of terror. The intensity and importance of this battle can be. used to 
justify the levels of violence employed. 8 This absence of a secular constituency leads to 
the sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of 
targets that may include anyone who is not a member of the terrorist's religion or 
religious sect.9 This ambivalence toward their victims could lead religious terrorists to 
use indiscriminate weapons that cause mass casualties to achieve their goals. 
Religious terrorism is becoming more common and more lethal. In a joint 
RAND-St. Andrew's University study, religious terrorist groups were found to increase 
as a portion of all terrorist groups from two of sixty-four (three percent) in 1980 to 
twenty-six of fifty-six (forty-six percent) by 1995.10 Not only have religious terrorist 
groups increased in number, over the past ten years they have been almost exclusively 
responsible for the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks. Some of the most significant 
terrorist acts of recent years have included a religious element. They include: 
• The 1993 bombing ofNew York City's World Trade Center by Islamic 
radicals who deliberately attempted to topple one ofthe twin towers onto the 
other; 
• The series of thirteen near-simultaneous car and truck bombings that shook 
Bombay, India in February 1993, killing four hundred persons and injuring 
more than one thousand others; 
8 Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," Journal of International Affairs 50, no.l 
(Summer 1996): 52. 
9 Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27. 
10 Ibid., 22. 
11 
• The March 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by an 
apocalyptic Japanese religious cult that killed a dozen persons and injured 
more than five thousand others; 
• The April1995 bombing of an Oklahoma City Federal building by two 
Christian Patriots where one-hundred sixty-eight persons perished; 
• The June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia, where nineteen persons perished, by religious militants; 
• The bombings ofthe U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 
that killed 257 and injured some five thousand others. 11 
Although the terrorists used WMD in only one of these attacks, in recent history terrorist" 
attacks have become more lethal, almost exclusively due to religious terrorists. If this 
trend were to continue, religious terrorists could seek more lethal ways to conduct 
attacks, perhaps even turning to nuclear or radiological weapons. 
2. Supremacists and "Doomsday" Groups 
Supremacist terrorist groups might desire to use nuclear or radiological weapons 
to achieve their goals. Supremacists do not rely so heavily on religion as a legitimizing 
force for their actions. Supremacists instead believe that they are the ultimate secular 
authority. They believe it is their duty to bring about the end of government and create a 
new world order. In contrast, "doomsday cult" terrorists would like to give history a 
push, helping create world-ending havoc replete with universal war, famine, pestilence, 
and other scourges. They believe the sooner the reign of the Antichrist is established, the 
sooner this corrupt world will be destroyed and a new heaven and earth will be realized.
12 
Supremacist groups have already displayed a desire to use WMD in terrorist 
attacks. A white supremacist group stockpiled cyanide, which it planned to dump in the 
reservoirs in Washington, D.C., and Chicago, thereby poisoning those cities' 
II Ibid., 23-25. 
12 Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 75, no.S (September-October 1996): 32. 
12 
populations. 13 In March 1995 two members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a militia-
type organization, were convicted of attempting to kill federal officials by mixing ricin 
with a solvent which would be absorbed through the skin. 14 Though neither of these 
attempted operations resulted in a successful mass casualty attack, they are evidence that 
these types of groups are willing to use unconventional methods. 
The combination of religious beliefs and a desire to destroy the world could 
inspire another possible type of terrorist organization that could want to use nuclear or 
radiological weapons. A urn Shinrikyo exemplified the combination of these influences. 
Aum's goal in staging the nerve gas attack was to lay down the foundations for a revolt 
against the Japanese government that would result in the creation of a new regime 
dedicated to the service of the sect's founder and leader, Shoko Asahara. 15 The 
combination of religious and right wing violence, which occurs among white 
supremacists in North America and in Jewish groups such as Kach, can be more 
dangerous. The possibility that they might move from chemical to nuclear weaponry is a 
real one that cannot be discounted.16 
3. Desire For Increased Publicity 
Terrorist groups may desire nuclear weapons to gain publicity. Most terrorist 
groups use violent attacks as a means to attract attention to their cause, hoping to attract 
sympathy to or at least empathy for their group and its beliefs. The increase in the 
number and lethality of terrorist attacks could lead some groups to attempt attacks that 
will create more publicity, causing an upward spiral of violence in terrorist attacks. The 
13 Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 28. 
14 Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, 116. 
15 Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3. 
16 Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, 116. 
13 
ability of terrorists to attract a widespread audience hinges on two factors: either they 
must involve victims of interest to the world's media, which probably means citizens of 
Western countries, or the implications or scale ofthe attack must be so immense that it 
will be covered for its own sake.17 
In the past, exploding a car bomb or blowing the windows out of a small shop 
may have been adequate to create the publicity desired by the terrorists. In the past ten 
years, however, terrorists have resorted to poisoning the air in subway systems and 
blowing up entire buildings to gain attention, thus possibly raising the bar of how much 
violence is needed to obtain publicity. For example, on 31 January 1996, a suicide 
bomber exploded a truck bomb with five hundred kilograms of high explosive in Sri 
Lanka, killing over one hundred people and injuring more than one thousand others. By 
2 February this incident was not even covered on the front page of the New York Times .
18 
In contrast, the bombings of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the 1998 
bombings of the United States embassies in Africa received widespread press coverage in 
the United States. Newspapers continue coverage on the anniversaries of the incidents. 
Even the report that Usama bin Laden has possibly acquired enriched uranium was only 
covered on page A3 ofthe New York Times. 19 
Some terrorists may believe that they need to create a more spectacular display in 
order to achieve the coverage they desire. They may judge that both the public and the 
media have become increasingly inured or de-sensitized to this spiral of violence. 
Accordingly, these terrorists may believe that it is necessary to undertake even more 
17 Ibid., 65. 
18 Ibid., 65. 
19 Benjamin Weiser, "U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material," New York Times, 26 
September 1998, A3. 
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dramatic or destructively lethal deeds to achieve the same effect that a less ambitious 
action may have had in the past.20 This equation of publicity and carnage with attention 
and success may lock some terrorists into an unrelenting spiral of violence to retain the 
media's attention and the public's interest.21 In speaking of the sarin attack by Aum 
Shinrikyo, one analysis drew a similar conclusion, noting that "it breaks a taboo and has 
psychological import. Others will ask whether such tactics should be adopted by them. 
It is now more likely that at least some will say yes."22 
B. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACQUISITION CAP ABILITY 
Motive, however, is not the only requirement for a terrorist group to use nuclear 
material in an attack. A terrorist group would have to not only desire radiological or 
nuclear weapons, but would also have to possess the capabilities required to use such 
weapons. Safely obtaining and employing nuclear materials are not easy tasks, so a 
terrorist group would need personnel with the necessary technical expertise to handle the 
dangerous materials. Only a few terrorist organizations either possess or have the 
potential to obtain the necessary financial and technological assets required for nuclear 
materials. Determining which terrorist groups represent a genuine threat to be able to 
acquire nuclear materials is ~he key to focusing interdiction efforts against these groups. 
Any terrorist group that would realistically be capable of acquiring a nuclear or 
radiological weapon would require a substantial financial network, and would need to 
have people who know how to handle nuclear materials safely. These requirements 
eliminate many terrorist groups as possible threats to acquire nuclear materials. Only the 
richest and most powerful terrorist organizations and those who may be sponsored by a 
20 Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 20. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
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nation state with access to nuclear materials can be considered a genuine threat in terms 
of nuclear or radiological weapons. 
1. Self Supporting Terrorists 
The State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 designates twenty-
eight Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) as active terrorists, plus an additional 
sixteen terrorist groups whose activities were not severe enough to be designated FTOs. 
A terrorist organization that has access to its own financial assets (or that receives 
contributions from a network of sympathizers) or a loose organization of terrorist groups 
that can pool their resources must be considered capable of acquiring nuclear materials. 
Of the twenty-eight designated FTOs, only a few meet these financial requirements. 
Due to their contact with multi-millionaire terrorist Usama Bin Laden and their 
worldwide support structure, the Abu Nidal Organization, al-Jihad, and al-Qaida possess 
the financial assets needed to acquire nuclear materials and to support an infrastructure 
capable of safely handling and transporting nuclear materials. Hezbollah has over 1,000 
members operating in Europe, North and South America, Africa, and Asia. It also has a 
recent history that includes the 1983 bombing ofthe U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut and 
possibly the 1996 bombing of a U.S. Air Force compound in Saudi Arabia. Aum 
Shinrikyo reportedly had assets in excess of one billion dollars and over 40,000 members, 
including people in Russia, China, Europe, and the United States.23 The Liberation 
Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE) have an estimated 10,000 armed combatants with an 
undetermined amount of overseas support, according to a State Department report. Even 
22 Cameron, "Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?'' 422. 
23 Ibid., 422. 
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though both Aum Shinrikyo and the L TTE have used WMD in past attacks, their recent 
behavior seems to indicate they are unlikely to target the United States in the future.
24 
Exactly what assets are required for a terrorist to acquire nuclear or radiological 
weapons is a question that must be addressed when determining which terrorists might 
obtain nuclear materials. Given the presumed need for anonymity and complete security, 
terrorists would probably build a bomb rather than steal a functioning nuclear. device. 
25 
For a gun-type nuclear weapon some scientists estimate that about ten kilograms of 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) could produce a twenty-kiloton explosion, while some 
University of California researchers claim that only three kilograms ofHEU would be 
sufficient. For an implosion weapon, about nine kilograms of plutonium is required, 
though the engineering ofthis type of weapon is much more difficult than that of the gun-
type weapon.26 
Determining exactly what acquiring nuclear material would cost a terrorist is 
difficult, though past foiled smuggling incidents provide a basis for an estimate. When 
Russian Navy Captain Alexiei Tikhomirov stole 4.5 kilograms of HEU from a Sevmorput 
shipyard in 1993, he hoped to receive $50,000 for the material. 27 Other reported cases of 
smuggling have priced lesser quantities of uranium in the $600,000-$700,000 range.28 As 
recently as June 2000, a Russian newspaper reported that two Kazakh nationals were 
24 The L TIE use of WMD consisted of a chlorine gas attack in June 1990. See Hoffman, Terrorism and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 47-48. 
25 Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, 131. 
26 
"The Feasibility of Building a Terrorist Nuclear Weapon," Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism 
[journal on-line];available from http://fore.thornson.com/janes. 
27 Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
51, no.3 (May/June 1995) [journal on-line] available from http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/ 
1995/mi95 bukharin.html. 
28 Renssela~r Lee, "Smuggling Update," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 11. 
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arrested for attempting to sell a capsule of osmium 187 for $60,000 a gram.29 Though 
some of these prices are dated, they prove that some terrorist organizations have the 
financial assets to obtain the materials required for a nuclear or radiological weapon. 
A terrorist organization would also need access to personnel with the technical 
ability to safely handle the nuclear materials to construct a weapon. Again, the 
worldwide terrorist network of al-Qadid, al-Jihad, Abu-Nidal, Hezbollah, and Aum 
Shinrikyo could afford to recruit nuclear scientists. The trial of Aum Shinrikyo revealed 
that the group had recruited three nuclear scientists and had sent its engineer to Russia 
thirteen times to inquire about the price of nuclear material.3
0 Usama Bin Laden is also 
reported to be recruiting Russian nuclear scientists by offering former Turkmenistan 
scientists $2,000 a month to work in Afghanistan.31 
2. State-Sponsored Terrorists 
Another category of terrorist groups that might obtain nuclear materials consist of 
those that receive assistance from nation states, especially states with nuclear programs. 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 identifies seven states as sponsors ofterrorism: Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Of those states, North Korea has 
nuclear programs, while Cuba, Iran and Iraq are attempting to acquire either civilian or 
military nuclear programs. Of the FTOs listed in the report, Hezbollah, HAMAS, the 
Kurdish Worker's Party, and Abu Nidal are known to receive support from Iran, though 
Hezbollah is believed to probably carry out some operations without Tehran's 
29 U.S. Department of Energy. Office oflntemational Materials Protection and Emergency Cooperation. 
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials Monthly Status Report (June 2000); 5. 
30 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Nuclear 
Terrorism and Countermeasures, 105th Cong., 151 sess., 1-2 October 1997,30. 
31 Emil Torabi. "Bin Laden's Nuclear Weapons," Complied fromAl-Watan al-Arabi, Al-Majalla, and Al-
Wasat in Muslim Magazine, winter 1999 [magazine on-line]; available from 
http:www.muslimrnag.org/winter99/34 _ 36.pdf. 
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knowledge. The Palestine Islamic Jihad and Mujahedin-E K.hlaq both receive support 
from Iraq. North Korea, which has a nuclear program, is not listed as a sponsor to any 
specific terrorist group, although it is believed that Pyongyang may sponsor some 
terrorist operations. 
State-sponsored nuclear terrorism may be less of a threat than a terrorist group 
that can work independently. A nation's nuclear program is.monitored by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if it is a signatory to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, the United States can more easily use its 
military as a deterrent toward governments than toward non-state actors. After the 1990-
1991 GulfWar,however, the UN Special Commission uncovered a clandestine nuclear 
program in Iraq, which was (and remains) a signatory to the NPT. 
By giving a terrorist group a nuclear or radiological device, a state could deny 
responsibility for an attack. A state also might use the terrorist group as a weapon or 
deterrent during a conflict in which the state had little hope of defeating the United States 
with conventional military forces. For the seven states listed, terrorist activity may 
provide the only realistic method for launching an attack against a more powerful 
enemy. 32 State sponsorship also may provide the financial and technical support 
necessary to acquire a nuclear or radiological weapon to a terrorist group that otherwise 
would not have access to these assets. 
C. INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORIST GROUPS 
The current United States counter-terrorism policy has four tenets: 
• First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. 
• Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. 
32 
"Potential Nuclear Terrorists." Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism [report on-line]; available from 
http:fore.thomson.com/janes. (05 August, 1999). 
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• Third, isolate and apply pressure to states that sponsor terrorism to force them 
to change their behavior. 
• Fourth, bolster the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries that work 
with the United States and require assistance. 33 
There are two major flaws in this policy. The first two tenets are reactive and 
only apply after a terrorist attack has taken place while the second two tenets focus on 
improving security overseas rather than improving counter-terrorist efforts in the United 
States. The United States must adopt more aggressive intelligence policies against 
terrorists to discover and interdict nuclear or radiological weapons before they arrive in 
the United States. Despite technical intelligence systems such as satellite photography 
and signal interceptors, they cannot give a complete picture of the intentions and 
capabilities of terrorist organizations. In testifying before Congress, former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) director James Woosley noted that "there is no substitute for 
human intelligence" but HUMINT is "expensive and hard."34 The participants in the 
Wild Atom analytic exercise noted "if we are going to get there before a (terrorist) bomb 
goes off we must have the intelligence to do it," and "technical collection can make 
important contributions, but is not likely to reveal fully what terrorists and other 
underground groups are up to."35 
The National Commission on Terrorism noted that improvements are needed in 
the area ofHUMINT operations. Specifically, the commission noted that, since inside 
information is the key to preventing attacks by terrorists, the CIA must aggressively 
recruit informants with unique access to terrorist plans. The commission recommended 
that the Director of Central Intelligence "make it clear aggressive recruitment of human 
33 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (April2000) [report on-line]; available 
from http://www .state.gov I global/terrorism/1999report/appb.html. 
34 U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy, 56. 
20 
intelligence sources on terrorism is one of the intelligence community's highest 
priorities."36 According to U.S. Air Force Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance, Major General John Casciano, "the intelligence community must do a 
better job in developing collection targets associated with WMD and then allocate the 
human resources to go after them."37 
Another area of HUMINT that requires improvement is the number of foreign 
linguists employed in the intelligence community. The National Commission on 
Terrorism found all United States government agencies face a drastic shortage of 
linguists to translate raw data and recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence 
develop a larger pool of linguists and an interagency strategy for employing them.
38 This 
need for linguists is especially important to uncover terrorist plots that may be operating 
from multiple countries and using numerous languages when communicating between 
factions. 
The major problem with using HUMINT. sources to uncover terrorist plots is that 
in many cases intelligence officers and law enforcement authorities cannot recruit the 
best people to get inside information on terrorist organizations, the terrorists themselves. 
As stated earlier, the first tenet of the U.S. counter-terrorism policy is to make no 
concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. This strategy may have some deterrent 
value, a judgment which is explored in Chapter IV, but (depending on how it is 
construed) it may work against the ability of intelligence agencies (specifically the CIA) 
35 CSIS Global Organized Crime Project, Wild Atom, 46. 
36 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. [report 
on-line]; available from http://www.fas.orglirp/threat/commission.html. 
37 John P. Casciano, "Intelligence Challenges," in Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, eds. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1998), 295. 
38 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. 
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to collect information against terrorists. Inside information is the key to preventing 
attacks by terrorists. The CIA must recruit informants with unique access to terrorists' 
plans. That sometimes requires recruiting those who have committed terrorist acts or 
related crimes, just as domestic law enforcement agencies routinely recruit criminal 
informants to pursue major criminal figures. 39 
The United States should amend its counter-terrorism policy to allow intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies to recruit terrorists as informants. Using terrorists as an 
intelligence source may allow the United States to gain more insight on the motivations 
and capabilities ofterrorist organizations. In testifying on intelligence's role in counter-
terrorism before Congress, former CIA director Woolsey stated: 
If one is going to recruit spies inside terrorist organizations, one is going 
to have to pay money and otherwise deal with some rather ugly people. 
But, as a general proposition, we should not be operating under guidelines 
that deter at all our case officers ability to recruit informants, spies, inside 
terrorist organizations based upon those terrorists' past behaviors.40 
Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. United States intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies must therefore use the full scope of their authority to collect 
intelligence regarding terrorist plans and methods.41 
Collecting informati9n is key to understanding the motivations and capabilities of 
terrorist groups. Infiltrating these groups with informants is very difficult, but HUMINT 
efforts are the best way to understand what the terrorists are up to. By identifying the 
terrorist organizations that pose a genuine threat of acquiring nuclear material for 
weapons, the United States can limit number of terrorist groups that need to be targeted. 
391bid. 
40 U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy, 46. 
41 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. 
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The United States should increase the HUMINT capability of its intelligence agencies, 
most specifically the CIA, and change the tenets of its counter-terrorism policy to recruit 
terrorists as informants to get a better knowledge of the terrorist groups that pose a threat 
of using nuclear materials. Given the seriousness of the possibility of terrorists with the 
capability of using nuclear or radiological weapons against the United States, in some 
cases preventing future attacks must take priority over punishing past actions. 
In sum, compelling new motives, such as those raised by religious terrorism, 
coupled with increased opportunities (e.g., greater and/or easier access to critical 
information and key components) to obtain enhanced capabilities, could portend an even 
bloodier and more destructive era of violence than before.42 There are too many terrorist 
groups active in the world for the United States to attempt to infiltrate all of them to 
discover their intentions. The increasing lethality of terrorist attacks demands the United 
States increase intelligence efforts against terrorist groups that can threaten its population 
with a nuclear or radiological weapon. 
42 Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 35. 
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III. SECURE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND INTERDICT SMUGGLING 
Programs aimed at securing nuclear materials and interdicting smuggling routes 
could offer the most promising method of disrupting a terrorist group's attempts to use 
nuclear or radiological weapons in an attack against the United States. Building a nuclear 
or radiological weapon is not easy, because nuclear materials are not widely available on 
the open market and are kept under tight security throughout most ofthe world." .. Safely 
handling nuclear materials requires a great deal of specialized knowledge that most 
people do not possess. Any attempt to transport nuclear materials would have to be done 
carefully and clandestinely to avoid the dangers of radiation exposure and arrest by the 
authorities. If the United States could better assist other countries in safeguarding their 
nuclear materials, employing nuclear scientists, and interdicting smuggling routes, the 
threat of a terrorist group using nuclear materials in an attack could be significantly 
reduced. 
A. SECURE NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
Though the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) lists 44 nations that possess 
either military or civilian nuclear programs, the nations that pose the most serious threat 
of"nuclear leakage" are the former Soviet Union (FSU) states, especially Russia. Russia 
has numerous civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons storage facilities, nuclear 
research complexes, and retired nuclear submarines awaiting dismantlement. Each of 
these facilities contains nuclear materials that could be used by a terrorist group. The 
large number of nuclear facilities throughout Russia coupled with the evidence of 
substandard security at some of these facilities illuminates the need for improvements in 
security. 
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There have been a number of documented cases involving stolen nuclear 
materials from facilities within the FSU. Although the majority of theft attempts turned 
out to be shams and the authorities apprehend most thieves, no one can know exactly how 
many of these thefts transferred nuclear materials to buyers. At least three thefts have 
provided grounds for concern because they were confirmed thefts of enough weapons-
grade material to produce a functional nuclear weapon. In the first case, Naval Captain 
Alexi Tikhomirov stole 4.5 kilograms ofHEU by slipping through a hole in a fence of the 
Sevmorpt Shipyard and cutting a padlock which served as the only security guarding the 
uranium.43 The second case involved the 1992 theft of3.7 pounds ofHEU by an 
employee of the Luch Scientific Association. 44 The final case was the discovery by 
German authorities of5.6 grams ofplutonium in the garage of a suspected criminal in 
May 1994.45 To date there have been 455 known cases of nuclear materials thefts that 
include fourteen involving weapons grade nuclear materials. The most recent theft of 
weapons grade nuclear materials was in April2000.46 
Another cause for concern is the claim by former Russian National Security 
Advisor Alexander Lebed that 84 "suitcase nuclear bombs" are missing from Russian 
inventories. According to Lebed, these 20x40x60cm bombs look like briefcases and can 
be activated by a lone operator without any need for authentication codes.47 If these 
43 Bukharin and Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better." 
44 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999), 7. 
45 William C. Potter, "Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States," in Pulling Back From the Nuclear 
Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats, eds. Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy 
(London: Frank Cass, 1998), 110. 
46 U.S. Department of Energy, Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials, 8. 
47 Moscow's NTV aired a report on these weapons on 22 September 1999. In the video, a person carried 
what appeared to be a normal briefcase into a room and set it on a table, then opened the briefcase to show 
a small control panel that contained a few push buttons. 
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"suitcase nukes" do exist (Russian authorities have denied that they were built but 
American scientists have testified that they could be constructed), a terrorist group that 
obtained one would have a functional nuclear weapon that would be almost impossible to 
locate once it was deployed. 
An additional cause for concern is the possibility that if the United States does not 
help FSU nations secure their nuclear materials, terrorist groups may find it even easier to. 
obtain them. As questionable as security at nuclear facilities throughout the FSU has 
been in the past, there are indications that security could become more unsatisfactory in 
the future. For example, by the year 2010, Russia will have commissioned ten new 
nuclear-powered icebreakers that use HEU for propulsion. This HEU will not even be 
under the questionable security of Russia's military complex but will be controlled by the 
civilian company that operates the icebreakers. Some analysts predict that economic and 
social conditions in Russia may continue to decline. If Russia falls on even harder times, 
the nuclear materials in Russia may be even more susceptible to theft; and the risk that a 
terrorist group could gain access to nuclear materials may increase. 
1. Cooperative Threat Reduction 
The United States ha~ recognized the dangers associated with poor nuclear 
materials security and has attempted to devise solutions to this problem. The Department 
ofDefense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is designed to assist FSU 
countries in dismantling their chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals. CTR has led to 
the creation of over fifty joint projects that range from "assisting in the dismantlement of 
thousands of strategic launchers" to chopping up Russian strategic bombers. CTR has 
also explored ways to seal permanently the test tunnels at the former Soviet nuclear 
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weapons test site at Semipalatinsk. 48 It should be noted that the Russians no longer use 
this test site and rely instead on the site at Novdyd Zemlya. CTR played a role in the 
transfer of over 1 ,000 nuclear warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to 
Russia, the transfer of over 2,500 Russian nuclear warheads from readiness to storage, 
and the elimination of over 630 bombers and ICBM launchers.49 
The major weakness of the CTR is that it focuses solely on strategic nuclear 
weapons and their delivery systems. Though the elimination of these weapons and 
delivery systems is important, there should be a greater emphasis placed on securing all 
nuclear materials, including those in reactors and propulsion systems, as well as from 
dismantled warheads. Despite Russia's nuclear security problems, there has never been a 
known case of a functional nuclear weapon being stolen. A bomber or a missile is not the 
only way the United States could be attacked with a nuclear or radiological weapon, yet 
these threats are the only ones the CTR attempts to eliminate. Removing nuclear 
weapons from ICBMs (mobile and silo-based) and from submarines, where they have 
historically been safe, to storage facilities with questionable security may not be the best 
way to improve the security of the United States. 
The CTR does little to help the United States improve its security vis-a-vis 
terrorists because it does not secure the majority of Russia's nuclear materials. The CTR 
could be a more effective asset in the fight against nuclear terrorism if it 
shifted its focus from strategic weapons to all nuclear materials. Researchers at the 
48 Gloria Duffy, "Cooperative Threat Reduction in Perspective" in Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NJS 
Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, eds. John M. Shields and 
William C. Potter (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 25. 
49 
"CTR Accomplishments," in Department of Defense's defenselink website [report on-line]; available 
from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ctr/accomplish.htrnl. 
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Center for Nonproliferation Studies have calculated that by the year 2003 there will be 
sufficient surplus quantities of plutonium from dismantled FSU nuclear weapons to 
construct nearly 40,000 primitive nuclear bombs. 5° If the Department of Defense 
expanded its definition of threat to include all nuclear materials that are not properly 
secured and used the CTR to assist FSU states in securing this material, the chances that a 
terrorist organization could acquire nuclear materials would be reduced .. 
2. Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program 
A second program the United States uses to improve nuclear material security is 
the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accountability Program 
(MPC&A). The MPC&A program assists Russia and other FSU nations by providing 
systems that limit access to and detect theft of nuclear materials. These systems include 
portal monitors and other devices to control access to storage sites. Material control is 
also achieved through the use of secure containers for nuclear materials, seals, and 
identification codes that make it possible to verify the location and condition of nuclear 
materials. 51 
The MPC&A program has been responsible for some impressive victories in the 
struggle to secure nuclear materials. 36 tons of Russian HEU has been blended down and 
delivered to America for use as reactor fuel, enough nuclear material for over 1500 
nuclear weapons. 52 The MPC&A program has established improved security programs 
through joint ventures in 62 nuclear facilities throughout Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
5° Center for Nonproliferation Studies estimate quoted by Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, "Illicit 
Trafficking in Nuclear Materials," Conflict Studies 314/315 (January/February 1999): 10. 
51 U.S. Department of Energy, MPC&A Program Strategic Plan. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1998), 5. 
52 Prepared remarks of U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, given at the 71h Carnegie International 
Non-proliferation Conference. Washington D.C., 11-12 January 1999 [speech on-line]; available from 
http://www .ceip. org/programs/npp/richardson. htm. 
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Russia. MPC&A officials say that they will have completed work at 100 nuclear 
facilities in the near future. 53 Unlike the CTR program, the MPC&A program focuses on 
both civilian and military nuclear facilities, though the MPC&A program is designed 
only to secure weapons grade materials. 
The MPC&A program, however, has some flaws. Since no one knows exactly 
how much nuclear material in FSU nations_must be guarded, no one knows how much 
material remains unaccounted. Since no physical inventory has ever been completed at 
any of the Russian nuclear facilities that contain tons ofhighly enriched uranium or 
plutonium, there is no realistic possibility of a comprehensive inventory being completed 
in the foreseeable future. 54 Even though security has been improved at 62 nuclear 
facilities, DOE analysts suggest that there may be as many as 150 additional nuclear sites 
that contain fissile materials. 55 Despite its successes, many in the United States assert 
that the MPC&A program is a waste of money that allows Russia to use American money 
on security while continuing to improve its nuclear weapons. 
For MPC&A to be more effective, it must expand the scope of its security efforts. 
All nuclear materials, not just weapons grade uranium and plutonium, must be secure. 
The United States must ensure that there is adequate protection at all nuclear facilities 
throughout the FSU. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that outfitting a nuclear 
facility in the FSU with adequate protection and inventory systems costs ten million 
dollars. Even if it cost one billion dollars over ten years to ensure that every nuclear 
53 
"Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear 
Disarmament." [report on-line]; available from http://www.cbo.gov. 
54 Prepared remarks of William Potter, given at the 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation 
Conference. Washington, D.C., 11-12 January 1999 [speech on-line]; available from http://www.ceip.org/ 
p_rograms/npp/potter.htm. 
""Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear 
Disarmament." 
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facility in the FSU has adequate security, the price would be far less than the cost of a 
single terrorist attack with nuclear materials against the United States. 
B. ASSIST NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS 
Even if a terrorist group could acquire the materials necessary for a nuclear or 
radiological weapon, it would still need to have people who knew how to handle the 
nuclear materials safely. As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are 
thousands of nuclear scientists, some ofwhom were employed to construct nuclear 
weapons, who were unemployed or underemployed. If the United States could deny 
terrorist groups the services of these highly trained personnel, the threat of a terrorist 
group using nuclear materials in an attack against the United States would be reduced. 
The quality of life for nuclear scientists in the FSU is therefore a concern for the 
United States. If these scientists can be employed in a peaceful nuclear program, there is 
a reduced chance that they would work for a terrorist organization. Desperate people are, 
however, ingenious in overcoming obstacles. Whatever technologies are deployed, 
significant proliferation risks will continue to exist if the personnel who must guard and 
manage nuclear weapons and fissile materials are underemployed, ill-paid, embedded in a 
culture of growing crime and corruption, and confronted with an uncertain future offering 
no assurance that they will be able to provide the necessities oflife for themselves and 
their families. 56 Keeping nuclear scientists gainfully employed throughout the FSU will 
help to ensure that terrorist groups cannot use these scientists' knowledge to conduct a 
nuclear or radiological attack. 
56 John P. Holdren and Matthew Bunn, "Reducing the Threat ofNuclear Theft," in The Road to Zero, ed. 




There is evidence that terrorist groups have already attempted to recruit Russian 
nuclear scientists to aid in acquiring nuclear weapons. Aum Shinrikyo had three Russian 
nuclear scientists working as part of the cult and had attempted to purchase nuclear 
materials and tactical nuclear weapons. 57 Usama bin Laden may also be using Russian 
nuclear scientists to build nuclear weapons. According to the journal AI-Watan al-Arabi 
"bin Laden, at his secret base in Khost, is preparing a nuclear complex and is hiring 
hundreds of nuclear scientists from the ex-Soviet republics. This is not difficult as he is 
offering $2,000 per month salary, compared to the pittance $100-$200 monthly wages 
they receive in Russia, often not paid for six months at a time."58 Iran, a state that 
sponsors terrorism, also may be offering similar salaries to nuclear scientists from the 
FSU.59 lfthese reports are true and ex-Soviet scientists are offering their services to 
terrorist groups, it is important that the United States find a way to keep these scientists 
working on peaceful projects at facilities in the FSU. 
1. International Science and Technology Center 
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) was established by the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan to underwrite civilian research by Russian 
scientists who formerly worked on the development ofWMD. The ISTC centers, located 
in Moscow and Kiev, were formed to prevent the proliferation of the knowledge and 
technology ofWMD. In particular, the ISTC was tasked with heading off the "brain 
57 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, 30. 
58 Torabi, "Bin Laden's Nuclear Weapons." 
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available from http://www.janesonline.com. 
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drain" of weapons scientists.60 Initiated in 1994, the ISTC originally was part ofthe 
DOD's CTR, but shifted to the State Department in 1996. 
The ISTC has had some successes in its six years of existence. At the end of 
1999, over 1 7,800 scientists at over 400 institutes throughout the former Soviet Union 
were either employed or had research funded by the ISTC. 61 The ISTC has been 
responsible for 785 projects totaling $216.7 millionin.nuclear-related research.62 
Clearly, the ISTC has played an important role in keeping some ofRussia's nuclear 
scientists employed, but many critics argue that the ISTC efforts are not enough to ensure 
that nuclear scientists do not find their way to terrorist groups or rogue states desiring 
nuclear weapons. 
Russia had ten secret nuclear cities that were responsible for constructing and 
maintaining the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. The ISTC has focused on the roughly 
130,000 scientists and other workers that were employed in these cities, but these 
scientists are not the only ones that present a threat of"brain drain" to terrorist 
organizations. Russia also has 29 civilian nuclear power plants grouped in nine locations 
and other nuclear research facilities that have scientists with nuclear expertise.63 The 
economic troubles that have plagued Russia in the past decade also have affected those 
involved in Russia's nuclear industry. While these scientists were not employed in 
60 Victor Alessi and Ronald Lehman III, "Science in the Pursuit ofPeace: The Success and Future of the 
ISTC," Arms Control Today, June/July 1998. [journal on-line]; available from 
http://www .armscontrol. org/ ACT /junjul98/vicjj9 8 .htm. 
61 
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making nuclear weapons in a secret nuclear city, they could nonetheless help to develop a 
nuclear or radiological weapon for a terrorist group. 
The State Department allocates roughly seven million dollars a year to the ISTC. 
Considering the positive effect this program could have in combating "brain drain" and 
proliferation, the United States might be well advised to spend more. The 17,800 
scientists covered under the ISTC are only about 14% of the 130,000 people who worked __ 
(or still work) in Russia's nuclear cities.64 Even though not all of those that were 
employed at Russia's nuclear cities were scientists that had knowledge of how to handle 
nuclear materials, undoubtedly there are many scientists that are not employed under the 
ISTC that do have this knowledge. If the harsh economic predictions for Russia come 
true, many more desperate scientists in Russia might be lured into working for a terrorist 
group. The United States must ensure that all nuclear scientists find ways to support 
themselves in Russia before they are tempted to assist a terrorist group that is seeking 
radiological or nuclear weapons. 
2. Initiatives for Proliferation Protection 
The Initiatives for Proliferation Protection (IPP) program also is designed to 
employ Russian scientists in peaceful ventures. Under DOE oversight, the IPP teams 
scientists from the United States and the FSU for joint research projects. The 413 
projects the IPP funds at 170 institutes cost about $30 million each year and employ 
64 
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1,700 scientists in Russia. 65 The focus ofthe IPP is to convert nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and defense industries into firms that have commercial applications. 
The IPP has some questionable effects as a program to fight against "brain drain." 
Only about 37 percent of the IPP's budget goes to FSU institutes, and the rest stays in the 
United States.66 In addition, only a portion of the funds that make it to Russia is received 
by the scientists, much of that funding is spent on administrative costs and taxes. paid to 
the Russian government. 67 As result of these financial allocations, the IPP's impact on 
stemming "brain drain" is questionable. Of the 413 projects the IPP has funded, only two 
have achieved self-sustaining status. The remainder of the projects have either failed or 
continue to rely on outside funding to survive. 68 If the United States could improve this 
program so that more of Russia's nuclear scientists could work on projects that become 
self-sustaining, the cost of the program to the United States would decrease and fewer 
Russian scientists might be tempted to work for a terrorist group. 
The U.S. General Accounting Office reports suggest that the IPP has not had a 
large positive impact in keeping Russian scientists employed in peaceful ventures. 
According to the GAO, the IPP is inefficient and only funds the work of a small 
percentage of Russia's nuclear scientists. If this is in fact the case, the money the United 
States spends on this project could be put to better use in a more efficient project like the 
ISTC, which helps a greater number of nuclear scientists. The United States must ensure 
65 U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Nuclear 
Proliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Nuclear 
Scientists, (February 1999) GAO/RCED-99-54, 19. 
66 Ibid., 27. 
67 Ibid., 31. 
68 Ibid., 20. 
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that as many Russian nuclear scientists as possible are employed to keep these scientists 
away from terrorist groups that seek radiological or nuclear weapons. 
3. Nuclear Cities Initiative 
The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is a joint United States-Russia program that is 
designed to stabilize Russia's ten nuclear cities and to reduce the incentives for weapons 
scientists and other nuclear workers to take their skills elsewhere .. 69.The NCLwas 
initiated in 1998 after the United States realized that previous attempts to employ 
Russia's nuclear scientists were not adequate. Even with efforts such as the ISTC and the 
IPP, Russia still plans to lay off 50,000 scientists that have been working on its nuclear 
program.70 An effort to keep at least some ofthese scientists employed, the NCI is 
designed to develop commercial enterprises for the residents of Russia's nuclear cities. 
The NCI should be an improvement over the IPP because it focuses only on 
Russia's nuclear scientists. Since it is a government-to-government program, Russian 
nuclear facilities should not have the tax problems involved with the IPP. The goal ofthe 
NCI is better focused than that of either the ISTC or the IPP because the NCI's sole 
purpose is employing the nuclear scientists at Russia's nuclear cities. The United States 
has not yet determined exactly how it will implement the NCI. Several options are under 
consideration, ranging from simply paying the salaries of approximately 20,000 nuclear 
scientists to using those scientists to assist in research projects. 
Since the NCI is a new project that is only beginning to be implemented, there is 
no data on its successes or failures. One area of concern is whether Russia can deliver a 
69 
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promised $30 million for the NCI. Another concern is the cost of the project, if the 
United States were to create all 50,000 jobs to compensate for the anticipated layoffs the 
total cost would be $550 million.71 Due to the current state ofRussia's economic system, 
there can be no guarantee that Russia will be able to support any portion of the NCI; this 
is a problem the United States must be prepared to face. By initiating the NCI, the 
United States has shown that it has an appreciation for the magnitude of the problem that. 
Russian "brain drain" presents. 
C. INTERDICT SMUGGLING ROUTES 
In addition to the problems Russia and other FSU nations pose for nuclear 
materials security, they also lack the capability to detect the smuggling of nuclear 
materials across their borders. The head of the Russian Customs section responsible for 
interdicting nuclear materials, Nikolai Kravchenkyo, admitted that "people who want to 
smuggle radioactive material can do so with little risk by simply substituting or 
increasing the material recorded on the export license or customs declaration, and 
customs officials have no way of knowing what is really inside the containers."72 In 
view of the many examples of nuclear materials from FSU countries confiscated in 
Europe and South Asia, Mr. Kravchenkyo's words ring true. 
Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, law enforcement agents throughout 
Europe uncovered many nuclear smuggling cases. Between 1991 and 1994 the number 
of nuclear smuggling cases in Germany increased from 41 to 267.73 In the first half of 
the 1990s, almost all of the smuggling cases involving nuclear materials from the former 
71 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Proliferation Concerns, 57. 
72 Lee, "Smuggling Update," 14. 
73 James L. Ford, "Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious a Threat?'' National Defense University Strategic 
Forum 59, January 1996 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/ forurn59 .htrnl. 
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Soviet Union were discovered in Eastern and Central Europe. By 1996, German officials 
reported that trafficking incidents had declined by more than half. 74 However, recent 
reports indicate that nuclear smuggling incidents actually might not have declined in the 
latter half of the 1990s. Rather, smugglers may have shifted their transport routes from 
Eastern Europe to the less protected borders of FSU countries. 
Nuclear smuggling incidents have,. for example, increased through Russia's 
southern borders in recent years. Between 1995 and 1999 there were twelve reported 
incidents of nuclear smuggling involving Turkey. 75 Two important observations can be 
made regarding the Turkish-related smuggling trend. First, all the nuclear materials 
originated in countries of the former Soviet Union. Second, the sheer number of cases 
indicates that Turkey may be a significant transshipment route for clandestine efforts to 
' 
buy or sell nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union.76 Thirteen of the 
sixteen seizures of nuclear materials reported in 2000 took place either in Russia or in 
countries south ofRussia.77 
Nuclear materials are easier to smuggle through Russia's southern borders, 
because these borders are not as well guarded as those leading to Europe. No radiation 
monitoring equipment has been deployed along Russia's borders with Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian states. Moreover, these countries lack the proper 
equipment to detect nuclear contraband. 78 In an effort to deal with this problem, the 
United States has instituted the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. 
74 Lee, "Smuggling Update," 12. 
75 Sandi Arnold and Michael Barletta, "Overview of Reported Nuclear Trafficking Incidents Involving 
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The SLD program is designed to assist Russia in preventing the smuggling of 
nuclear materials and nuclear weapons at its borders, either by land, sea or air. 
79 The 
SLD program accomplishes this goal by helping to train and equip Russia's customs 
service and border police officers so they can detect nuclear smuggling.
80 The program 
has two initial goals. First, it seeks to procure Russian-manufactured radiation detection 
equipment to be used at customs sites. DOE hopes that purchasing equipment for Russia 
will quickly reduce the vulnerability of Russia's weakest customs sites. Second, the SLD 
strategy is to develop training programs for Russian customs officials.
81 
Like the other programs discussed in this chapter, the SLD program faces an 
uphill battle due to the enormous task of improving Russia's customs enforcement. On 2 
September 1998 the first equipment of the SLD program was installed at Moscow's 
Sheremetyevo-1 international airport. Additional monitoring stations were installed the 
next month at the Caspian Seaport of Astrakhan and are scheduled for other Moscow 
airports.82 These initial efforts, however, only begin to scratch the surface of the nuclear 
smuggling problem. Russia has nearly 500 border checkpoint locations spread across 
thousands of miles, to say nothing ofthe feasibility of illegal border crossings. If 
monitoring equipment was installed at only fifteen high priority locations, the cost would 
be about $70 million. 83 
79 Deborah Yarsike Ball, "The U.S. Second Line ofDefense: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Across 
Russia's Borders," [report on-line]; available from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/ 
policy%2 Omemos/ba115 0 .html. 
80 
"Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear 
Disarmament." 
81 Ball, "The U.S. Second Line of Defense." 
82 U.S. Department of Energy. "Richardson, Russian Federation Dedicate Second Line of Defense," 
[report on-line]; available from http://www.doe.gov/news/releases98/seppr/pr98112.htm. 
83 
"Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear 
Disarmament." 
39 
The United States must continue its efforts to stop terrorist groups from acquiring 
nuclear materials. If nuclear materials are harder to obtain, the threat of a terrorist group 
acquiring a nuclear or radiological weapon will be reduced. The United States has 
invested in a number of programs designed to secure nuclear materials and employ 
nuclear scientists throughout the FSU. Unfortunately, the size of the Soviet nuclear 
program and the.current state of national economies throughout the FSU make the job. of. 
securing all the nuclear materials and employing all the nuclear scientists extremely 
difficult. In addition, the United States has recognized that even with the efforts to secure 
nuclear materials there could still be some attempts to smuggle nuclear material out of 
Russia; so it has initiated the SLD program. Most of these programs focus only on one 
aspect of the nuclear programs in the former Soviet Union, nuclear weapons. For the 
United States to reduce the threat of a terrorist group gaining possession of a nuclear or 
radiological weapon, it should ensure that as many sources of radioactive material and 




The United States used deterrence as the basis of its defense strategy against the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today many debate whether deterrence can be 
effective against terrorist groups. The participants in Wild Atom recognized this problem, 
asking "how does one deter a terrorist group bent upon a catharsis of violence-- one 
without territory or a population at risk?"84 This chapter investigates this question by 
evaluating deterrence from two perspectives. First, it explores how the United States can 
apply deterrence in the classic sense of protecting itselfby communicating the credible 
threat of unacceptable retribution should the enemy decide to launch an attack. Second, 
this chapter explores the possibility of employing deterrence strategies other than the 
threat of massive retaliation to influence the actions of terrorists. 
A. CLASSIC PUNITIVE DETERRENCE 
Proponents of deterrence still advocate relying on threats of punishment as a 
defense against aggression. In 1997, the then-Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic 
Command (STRA TCOM), General Eugene B. Habiger, noted that deterrence still rests 
on three perceptions; that aggression poses unacceptable risks, that no potential adversary 
will have the opportunity to inflict a disarming strike, and that any potential adversary 
will face an assured, significant, and credible retaliatory capability. 85 Punitive deterrence 
could hypothetically be used to stop nuclear or radiological terrorism by targeting either 
the terrorists themselves or by targeting the states that sponsor terrorism. By targeting 
each of these components of terrorism, the United States will have a better chance to alter 
terrorist intentions to use nuclear or radiological weapons against U.S interests. 
84 CSIS Global Organized Crime Project, Wild Atom, xv. 
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1. Classic Deterrence Targeting Terrorist Groups 
The United States has proven its willingness to use classic deterrence against 
terrorists, both in declaratory policy and in conducting military operations. The first 
element ofUnited States terrorism policy is to make no concessions to terrorists and to 
strike no deals. The second element is to bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. 86 
U.S. military doctrine has even indicated that non-state actors (terrorist groups).that 
possess WMD could be legitimate targets for a nuclear strike. 87 After the 1998 terrorist 
bombings at the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States 
retaliated with missile attacks at a chemical facility in Sudan and terrorist training camps 
in Afghanistan. These declarations and actions suggest that the United States is serious 
about backing up its strong talk with tough actions against terrorists. 
Some experts believe that the United States policy may not be enough to deter 
terrorists possessing nuclear or radiological weapons. The participants in the CSIS Wild 
Atom study recommended that the United States adopt a more aggressive counter-
terrorism policy by declaring that any entity possessing non-safeguarded nuclear material 
must immediately give it up or be considered fair game for United States pre-emptive 
action.88 Using the threat of punishment, either in a pre-emptive or retaliatory strike, as 
a deterrent requires that the adversary believe that the United States is capable of and 
willing to launch a military strike. While the 1998 missile attacks against the chemical 
facility and terrorist training camps exemplify American intent to punish terrorists for 
85 General Eugene B. Habiger, "Deterrence in a New Security Environment," Strategic Forum 109, April 
1997 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ strforum/forum109.htrnl. 
86 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. 
87 Joint Pub 3-12.1. "Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations." 9 February 1996, III-7. 
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their crimes, at times the United States may not have the capability to retaliate against 
terrorism. 
The United States still has not been able to determine the identity of the terrorists 
responsible for the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Usama bin 
Laden has been on the FBI's most wanted list for years but he still remains at large. 
Moreover, there has been debate about whether the chemical facility at Khartoum.was 
actually used to make chemical weapons. For punitive deterrence to be effective against 
terrorists, the terrorists must believe they will not be able to get away with an attack. In 
order to threaten terrorists with retaliatory punishment, the United States must first know 
who to hold responsible for an attack. 
Deterrence poses a special challenge when countering a terrorist threat. 
Retaliation requires knowledge ofwho has launched an attack and where to find them. 
Those requirements are not a problem when the threat comes from a government, but 
they are a problem if the enemy is anonymous, like most terrorists.89 Any terrorist group 
competent enough to carry out a nuclear or radiological attack against the United States is 
probably intelligent enough to understand that doing so would bring the full weight 
of the world's only superpower down upon it, assuming of course that the United States 
learns the identity and location of the attacker. This suggests that if deterrence fails, it is 
likely to have failed not because the attacker underestimated the cost of conducting the 
s9 Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat ofMass Destruction," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1998): 
34. 
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attack, because it: (a) believed it could escape detection; (b) believed alternative courses 
of action were worse; or (c) for reasons of fanatical motivation or dementia did not care 
about the prospect ofpunishment.90 
Relying upon threats of punishment as a deterrent against terrorist groups presents 
a number of possible problems. Threatening to punish terrorists for their attacks is 
plausible only if the terrorists believe that they will bejdentified, buUdentification has 
proven to be difficult for the United States. Using deterrence as a strategy also may 
hamper other counter-terrorist efforts. By declaring that it will strike no deals with 
terrorists, the United States is sending the message to terrorists that, if caught, there is no 
chance the terrorists can decrease the severity of their punishment in exchange for 
offering information. While this may provide some benefits as a deterrent to terrorists, it 
also may hamper intelligence efforts that could gain insight into terrorist organizations, 
prevent future terrorist attacks, or lead to the arrest of more dangerous terrorist leaders. 
To use punishment as an effective deterrent against terrorists, the United States must 
improve its capability to back up its declarations with effective actions. 
2. Classic Deterrence Against State Sponsors of Terrorism 
Another way to use deterrence to protect the United States against nuclear or 
radiological terrorist attacks is to target the state sponsoring the terrorists that might 
acquire nuclear or radiological weapons. All terrorist organizations reside in territory 
claimed by some government. Terrorists may have their own financial assets, weapons, 
and leadership, but they all operate or are sheltered in territory administered by some 
government. Threatening governments that sponsor terrorists with retaliatory punishment 
90 Richard A Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 326. 
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may be effective in deterring those governments from supporting nuclear or radiological 
terrorism. 
In 1999 the United States redesignated seven states as sponsors ofterrorism: 
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
also considered worrisome because they tolerate terrorists living and moving freely 
within their territory. 91 Chapter II examined the increased potential of state-sponsored 
terrorists to acquire nuclear or radiological weapons. Especially troublesome are 
terrorists supported by Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria, because these 
states either have or are suspected of trying to obtain nuclear weapons. States that have 
the potential to produce nuclear or radiological weapons and that support terrorism could 
provide terrorists with assistance in carrying out a nuclear or radiological attack against 
the United States. Punitive deterrence directed at these states may help the United States 
convince these states not to sponsor nuclear or radiological terrorism. 
States are better targets for punitive deterrence because the United States can 
more easily target the leaders and assets of countries. The central target of deterrence is 
the political leadership of an opposing nation, because that is where the ultimate decision 
to use military force may be p1ade.92 Not all states that sponsor terrorism, however, 
actually direct the actions of the terrorists. If the United States could affect the decision 
making processes of the countries that directly control and sponsor terrorism, it could 
indirectly frustrate the ambitions of terrorists that may desire to conduct a nuclear or 
radiological attack. 
91 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. 
92 Joint Pub 3-12. "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations." 15 December 1995, I-2. 
45 
A country that sponsors terrorism could be directly or indirectly responsible for 
assisting a terrorist who might conduct a nuclear or radiological attack against the United 
States. A state could be held directly responsible for a nuclear or radiological terrorist 
attack if that state actually provided the nuclear or radiological weapons to the terrorists 
and directed an attack. By contrast, a state could be indirectly responsible for a nuclear 
or radiological terrorist attack if it only provided general assistance to the terrorist group 
without actually directing or even having knowledge of the nuclear or radiological attack. 
Chapter II identified terrorists that could potentially carry out nuclear or radiological 
attacks without any direct assistance from a state sponsor. Though this distinction could 
be difficult to discern, it is important because it affects the way punitive deterrence could 
be used in each situation. 
The United States should make it clear that a state that directly assists terrorists 
conducting a nuclear or radiological attack against the United States will be held just as 
responsible for the attack as if that state's military forces had conducted the attack. When 
using punitive deterrence against states, the United States faces a problem distinct from 
attempting to coerce terrorist groups. The difficulty in coercing states is not a question of 
capability but rather of credibility. No one can argue about the United States ability to 
conduct a strike against a foreign government. There may be some doubt, however, as to 
whether the United States would conduct a strike against the leadership of a government 
that may have sponsored nuclear or radiological terrorism. 
Joint Pub 3-12.1 lists WMD and their delivery systems, as well as associated 
command and control, production, and logical support units as possible targets for U.S. 
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nuclear strikes.93 If one accepts the proposition that terrorist forces directed by a state 
could be considered equivalent to military forces, the facilities of the state that sponsors 
nuclear or radiological terrorism are legitimate targets for retaliation. (U.S. retaliation 
would not, however, necessarily include the use of nuclear weapons. The United States 
has many non-nuclear means of retaliation and multiple incentives to avoid operational 
employment of nuclear weapons.) Classic deterrence only works ifforeign governments 
understand and believe that the United States will hold states that sponsor terrorism 
responsible for the consequences of the terrorist attacks they direct. Ensuring that states 
understand how the United States views direct sponsorship of terrorism could become 
important during a crisis or hostilities between the United States and one of these 
governments. 
States that have terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons under them 
may believe these assets form the basis of an asymmetric strategy to offset the military 
superiority of the United States. To prevent United States intervention in some future 
conflict, adversaries may apply asymmetric challenges in peacetime, in a crisis, and very 
early in a conflict. Such challenges would attack United States willpower or disrupt 
United States planning, causing a strategic pause. A terrorist attack might force the 
United States to disengage in a regional conflict. 94 A state could use terrorists to deliver 
radiological devices covertly, minimizing the risk of United States intervention or 
retaliation. Whether a state would choose to utilize such a capability is another question, 
but it is not inconceivable.95 
93 Joint Pub 3-12.1, III-6. 
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The United States must be aware of the threat posed by states that may possess 
nuclear or radiological weapons and sponsor terrorism, especially if the United States 
gets involved in a military conflict with one of these states or their allies. The United 
States should have a clear, credible policy to use as a deterrent against these 
governments. Not all states that sponsor terrorism, however, actually direct the actions of 
the terrorists they support. In these cases, the threat of unacceptable retaliation may not 
be credible, because the United States could face a great deal of political hostility from 
other nations if it executed retaliatory strikes in ambiguous circumstances. This is 
especially important since the United States now rarely conducts coercive actions without 
the support of allies. Governments that indirectly support terrorism can still be deterred, 
though the threat of massive retaliation may not be the most effective option for 
influencing those governments. 
B. MODIFIED DETERRENCE 
Deterring terrorists or the states that sponsor terrorism may require more than just 
the threat of military retaliation that would cause massive and presumably unacceptable 
damage. Punitive deterrence threats may work against strong countries like Russia and 
China that are easy to target and have a capability to use military forces to attack the 
United States. None of the states that sponsor terrorism or the terrorists have the 
capability to engage the United States successfully in conventional combat, which is a 
reason they resort to terrorism in the first place. Still, the United States must be able to 
affect the decisions of terrorists or the states that sponsor them, especially when the 
possibility that nuclear or radiological weapons may be involved in terrorist attacks. 
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Classic punitive deterrence alone may not offer the best protection from nuclear or 
radiological terrorism. 
Successful deterrence requires coercive power. Power represents the ability to 
achieve a desired outcome. Coercive power represents the ability to achieve a desired 
outcome by influencing another actor's behavior. 96 Deterrence then can be thought of as 
the ability to influence behavior, which for the purposes of this thesis is the behavior of 
terrorists desiring to use nuclear or radiological weapons. If the United States can 
influence the behavior of terrorists without resorting solely to the threat of punitive 
retaliation, the United States can improve its ability to deter terrorists from using nuclear 
or radiological weapons in an attack against the United States. To deter terrorists and 
terrorism-sponsoring states, the United States should design and implement a new 
deterrent strategy that is guided by several interrelated principles: maintaining a balanced 
perspective on punitive deterrence's contributions, moving beyond the threat of punitive 
retaliation alone to create incentives for restraint, and demonstrating resolve through 
peacetime actions.97 
The United States has a number of options available to use modified deterrence 
against nuclear or radiological terrorism. If the United States could improve its domestic 
defenses against nuclear and radiological attacks, terrorists might decide an attack with 
these weapons would be too difficult and not worth the risk. The other aspect of covert 
NBC deterrence that needs improvement falls into the category of deterrence by denial. 
The United States is vulnerable to covert NBC attacks, due to the difficulty of detecting 
96 Edward Rhodes, Power and Madness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 82. 
97 Paul I. Bernstein and Lewis A. Dunn, "Adapting Deterrence to the WMD Threat." in Countering the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, eds. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van 
Tassel (NewYork: McGraw Hill, 1998), 151. 
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preparations for these attacks in the first place and to its limited ability to mitigate the 
consequences of such attacks. 98 The simplest mode of coercion involves threats by the 
coercer directly related to the end sought by the opponent. An opponent may be deterred 
from undertaking some action because of the coercer's credible commitment directly to 
prevent him from achieving, without unacceptable difficulty, the goal that motivated that 
particular action. 99 
To illustrate the point, if someone did not want to have his house broken into, he 
could adopt a punitive deterrent strategy and ensure that everyone knows that the owner 
of the house owns a gun and will shoot any trespassers on sight. Rational actors would 
then presumably not attempt to break into the house for fear of suffering unacceptable 
damage. Alternatively, the owner of the house could adopt a modified deterrent strategy 
and make it impossible to break into the house by erecting a large fence, surrounding the 
house with motion detectors, and placing alarms at every entrance to the house. Now 
rational actors would presumably not attempt to break into the house because they know 
they cannot do so without being caught. Either way, the owner of the house is 
influencing the decisions of would-be burglars, thus deterring them from breaking into 
the house. 
The United States has several options to deter would-be nuclear or radiological 
terrorists. The United States, for example, could increase the rewards for surrendering 
fissile material or providing information on undeclared stocks or nuclear smuggling.
100 
The United States could push to make prohibited weapons development a universal 
crime, opening the way to prosecution and extradition of individual offenders wherever 
98 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 327. 
99 Rhodes, 91. 
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they might be found. This idea utilizes the power of criminal law against individuals, not 
the power of international law against governments. 101 Since nuclear and radiological 
weapons are difficult to produce, the United States could expand nuclear material 
smuggling laws to include not only those individuals found in possession of nuclear 
materials, but also those responsible for conveying the nuclear materials to the terrorists. 
In essence, any action the United States .takes that makes it more. difficult for 
terrorists to use nuclear or radiological weapons may have an indirect positive effect on 
deterrence. Nuclear and radiological weapons would be relatively difficult to acquire. 
Using these types of weapons in an attack would be expensive and require a great deal of 
planning. Therefore it is logical to assume that any terrorists attempting to use nuclear or 
radiological weapons would do so with a high amount of confidence the attack would be 
successful. If the United States could improve its capability to infiltrate terrorist 
organizations and disrupt plans for a nuclear or radiological attack or improve defensive 
capabilities so as to increase to odds of capturing terrorists before they could detonate a 
nuclear or radiological weapon, some terrorists that might be inclined to seek these 
weapons could be deterred, in view of the great risk of failure. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States can deter terrorists from using nuclear or radiological weapons 
in an attack against the United States. The United States, however, cannot rely solely on 
punitive retaliation to deter terrorists or the states that may sponsor them. The United 
States must instead adopt a new strategy of deterrence, a strategy that combines classic 
punitive deterrence with modified deterrence concepts. By using both types of 
10° CSIS Global Organized Crime Project, Wild Atom, 49. 
101 Carter, Deutch, and Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism." 
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deterrence, the United States may be able to influence the desires and capabilities of 
terrorists to use nuclear or radiological weapons so that fewer terrorists will attempt to 
use them in attacks against the United States. 
Current United States military doctrine states that terrorists that acquire WMD or 
the states that sponsor them are legitimate targets for a pre-emptive strike, possibly even 
with nuclear weapons: "Operations must be planned and executed to destroy enemy 
WMD and their delivery systems and supporting infrastructure before they can strike 
friendly forces." 102 Whether the United States would actually strike terrorists or 
terrorism-sponsoring states with nuclear weapons is highly debatable; this uncertainty 
may actually work against deterrence. Some analysts have argued that the United States 
should outline a policy indicating that both nuclear and conventional retaliation could be 
considered in response to a terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
According to David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening ofthe RAND 
Corporation "conventional and nuclear retaliatory threats have complementary strengths 
and weaknesses, the combination of the two may be enough to persuade the adversary 
that using nuclear or radiological weapons definitely will produce a bad result, and might 
produce a horrendous result."l03 Combining the threat of nuclear and conventional 
retaliation increases the deterrent effects because the combination communicates the fact 
the United States has the option of choosing responses ranging from massive to precision 
destruction. 
The United States should focus more on developing and improving modified 
deterrent strategies other than punitive deterrence. Among potential adversaries, the fear 
102 Joint Pub 3.12-1, ix. 
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of a well-armed and resourceful United States may well have accelerated the search for 
asymmetric strategies. Such strategies seek to put the strengths of the weak against the 
vulnerabilities of the strong; they threaten to inflict huge casualties on United States 
power projection forces and American citizens through unconventional attacks with 
unconventional weapons. 104 The United States does not know what types of terrorists 
may present the greatest threat of using nuclear or radiological weapons. This , . 
uncertainty demands that the United States be able to deter a wide variety of nuclear or 
radiological terrorist threats. The best deterrence strategy will combine the attributes of 
punitive and modified deterrence strategies. Any action the United States undertakes that 
will make it more expensive or more difficult for terrorists to use nuclear or radiological 
weapons in an attack will increase the ability to deter nuclear or radiological terrorism. 
103 David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Surviva/37, 
no.3 (Autumn 1995): 36. 
104 Brad Roberts, "Rising Powers: Weapons Proliferation and New Great Powers," quoted in Lt. Col. 
Lansing E. Dickenson, "The Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," 
[report on-line]; available from http://w,vw.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubsidickenson.htm. 
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V. RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACQUISITION OR USE OF NUCLEAR OR 
RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
The three strategies to defend against nuclear or radiological terrorism evaluated 
thus far focus on efforts to deny terrorists the capability or desire to acquire nuclear or 
radiological weapons. Despite these efforts the United States must be prepared to combat 
terrorists that have gained possession of nuclear or radiological weapons. Even if faced 
with the unpleasant scenario of nuclear or radiological weapons in the hands ofterrorists, 
the United States is not powerless in defending itself from an attack. New technologies, 
nuclear response teams, and effective use of the military could help the United States 
protect its citizens from nuclear or radiological terrorism. The United States must also 
become better prepared to cope with the effects of a successful terrorist attack involving 
nuclear or radiological weapons. 
Two steps must occur if the United States is to intercept terrorist nuclear or 
radiological weapons before they are detonated. First, the United States must determine 
the exact location of the nuclear or radiological weapons. Second, the United States must 
dispatch forces to intercept the weapons if they have already been brought into the United 
States (or assembled in this country) or to destroy the weapons abroad before they can be 
smuggled into the country or employed. If the United States possessed improved 
interception capabilities, the chances a terrorist could detonate a nuclear or radiological 
weapon in the United States would be greatly reduced. 
A. NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL WEAPON INTERCEPTION 
The first step in intercepting a nuclear or radiological weapon is determining its 
exact location. Intelligence efforts will certainly be critical in gaining this information, 
but the United States cannot expect that the intelligence community will always be able 
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to determine the precise location information required to intercept terrorist nuclear or 
radiological weapons. The United States must be able to determine the location of 
nuclear or radiological weapons without counting on intelligence agencies to be able to 
offer information leading to the exact location of the weapons. 
1. Wide Area Tracking System 
Scientists and engineers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 
California have developed a promising new program that is designed to locate nuclear or 
radiological weapons before they can be used by terrorists. Named the Wide Area 
Tracking System (WATS), this system can provide the United States with weapons 
location information that could allow authorities to dispatch emergency response teams 
or order a military strike to intercept nuclear or radiological weapons before they can 
reach their intended targets. 
W ATS couples information obtained from multiple sensor arrays of portable 
radiation detectors that are strategically placed throughout an area to be protected. 
WATS uses data-fusion to detect, identify, and track a nuclear or radiological device. 105 
An expandable array of unattended sensors (radiation and vehicle detectors) is deployed 
within the area to be protected. The sensors then relay radiation detection information 
via standard communications links to a computer located at a central control station. 
Using data-fusion techniques, information from the sensors is integrated and combined 
with other available data to detect and track a nuclear or radiological device. 106 
105 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security 




In essence, W ATS uses portable detectors to identify radiation emitted from 
nuclear or radiological devices. These cadmium-zinc-telluride detectors can separate the 
gamma and x-ray emissions by fissile materials from normal background radiation. The 
sensors are small enough to be placed throughout the area to be protected on objects such 
as streetlights, telephone poles, or buildings. The sensors also can be placed on vehicles, 
making W ATS portable. These sensors then relay this location information.in reaLtime 
to a databank that fuses the location information with other information such as traffic 
patterns and prior readings (the data-fusion technique). By fusing all this information, 
W A TS operators can determine the nuclear or radiological weapons' movements and can 
guide response units to intercept the nuclear or radiological weapon. 
One of the present drawbacks ofWATS is that it can only protect a small area, 
such as a port facility or an airport. Plans to expand the capability of W ATS are 
progressing. In January 1999, W ATS was exercised in a suburban environment where it 
demonstrated its ability to locate and track a simulated nuclear device throughout a 
section of Las Vegas. The major limitation of W ATS resides in its ability to filter out 
completely nuclear or radiological weapon radiation from normal background radiation at 
large distances. Technological advances may produce sensors with increased 
detection capabilities that could possibly be deployed over a greater area or on aircraft to 
expand the area protected by WATS. 
Another limitation of W ATS is the requirement for radiation to be emitted from 
the weapon. Such radiation can be greatly reduced by simply placing nuclear or 
radiological weapons in a lead box or in heavy water. There are other techniques, 
however, such as active particle bombardment with gamma rays and neutrons that could 
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detect the presence of lead or heavy water shielding. This information could also be 
fused into the W ATS database, at least giving the operator the ability to lead interdiction 
forces to the shielding components if the nuclear or radiological weapon itself could not 
be easily identified or located. 
2. Response Units 
Locating nuclear or radiological weapons is only half of the battle in protecting 
against a terrorist attack. The United States also must have the ability to intercept and 
either disable or destroy nuclear or radiological weapons before they can be detonated. 
The United States has, however, relatively few units that are capable of intercepting 
nuclear or radiological weapons compared to the number of units capable of responding 
to the detonation of nuclear or radiological weapons. While several units can bring 
specialized training and equipment to the scene of a nuclear or radiological attack, only 
the DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST), Accident Response Group 
(ARG), the DOD's Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG), and the U.S. Army's 
52nd Ordnance Group have the personnel and equipment to respond to nuclear or 
radiological weapons before a detonation occurs. 
NEST was established in the mid-1970s to protect against the threat of nuclear 
extortion, which resulted in NEST capabilities that require a relatively large amount of 
time to deal with possible nuclear or radiological weapons scenarios. Since nuclear or 
radiological terrorism was not considered a threat at that time, NEST capabilities were 
developed for large-scale deployments. The NEST process was thorough, but very slow 
because it was assumed there would be enough time in an extortion crisis to deploy all 
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NEST assets. 107 Today the threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism is much more acute. 
Since 1992, NEST capabilities have been altered to meet the new threat. Specifically, 
NEST capabilities currently focus more on improving efforts to locate, seize, and recover 
I d. I . I d . Ios a nuc ear or ra 10 og1ca ev1ce. 
NEST capabilities are made up of several components that include search and 
identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear 
devices, and disablement process. NEST personnel and equipment come from an all-
volunteer community composed of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the nuclear 
weapons design laboratories. Operational deployments could be as large as 800 
personnel ifrequired. 109 NEST personnel have participated in a number of training 
exercises, working with DOD emergency response units and other government agencies. 
The exercises have ranged from interagency meetings to discuss command and control 
procedures to field training exercises to identify weaknesses and improve response 
capabilities. 
A second DOE response group, the ARG, includes nuclear scientists, specialists, 
and crisis managers, plus their specialized equipment. The ARG can be dispatched on 
short notice to recover weapons and handle radioactive materials. 110 Although designed 
primarily to respond to the detonation of nuclear or radiological weapons, the ARG units 
have the personnel and equipment necessary to intercept and dispose of a weapon before 
it can be used in an attack. Like NEST, ARG units are on call twenty-four hours a day 
and are ready to deploy anywhere in the world. Whereas NEST units are designed to 
107 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, 63. 
108 Ibid., 9. 
109 Ibid., 63. 
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locate nuclear or radiological devices, the ARG is designed to provide technical and 
operational expertise and guidance to other response units in the event of nuclear or 
radiological incidents. 
The ARG consists of a volunteer force of approximately 400 scientific advisors, 
weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear and high explosives safety, and 
other personnel required to safely handle nuclear or radiological weapons. The ARG 
units consist oftwo custom-designed trucks with trailers that can be loaded into a C-141, 
C-5 or two C-130 U.S.A.F. aircraft. An ARG advance party can be deployed two hours 
after initial notification of a nuclear or radiological incident, whereas the remainder ofthe 
unit and the required equipment can be deployed in about four hours. 
111 Once on scene, 
the mobile lab can be set up within an hour. It is designed to remain on station for 
several weeks. 112 
The DOD also maintains two units that could be used to intercept terrorist nuclear 
or radiological weapons. The first is the Defense Technical Response Group (DTRG), 
which is part of the U.S. Navy's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Division (EOD). The 
second unit is the U.S. Army's 52nd Ordnance Group that operates out ofFort Gillem, 
Georgia. Both the DTRG ffil:d the 52nd Ordnance Group specialize in responding to short 
notice calls to disable nuclear and radiological weapons. 
In contrast to the DOE personnel that must deploy mostly from only three areas of 
the United States (the location of the three nuclear weapons laboratories), the EOD units 
110 
"Briefing, At Hand to Deal With an Underhand Attack." Jane's Defence Weekly 26, no.7 (August 14, 
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are located at numerous areas throughout the country. Whereas the personnel who 
compose NEST and ARG units are volunteers who train as part of a response unit only 
part time, the members of the DTRG and the 52nd Ordnance Group are constantly training 
in weapons disposal tasks. NEST and the two DOD units offer the best chance for the 
United States to intercept and safely dispose of terrorist nuclear or radiological weapons 
before an attack can be carried out. 
Several problems must be addressed to improve response capabilities. 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 designates the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 
(FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as lead agencies in 
responding to a nuclear or radiological incident. Neither the DOE or the DOD, the only 
two agencies in the United States that possess the capability to intercept and disable 
nuclear or radiological weapons, would be a lead agency in the event of an imminent 
terrorist nuclear or radiological attack. Before any of the emergency response units could 
be deployed they would have to be requested from the lead agency, and they would 
answer to either the FBI or FEMA. This organizational shortcoming could be easily 
remedied by either designating a different lead federal agency or by outfitting the FBI 
and FEMA with their own nuclear and radiological response capabilities. 
U.S. legislation poses another problem with using the DTRG or the 52nct Ordnance 
Group to respond to a terrorist threat inside the United States. The law does not allow the 
use of active duty military personnel in security operations within the United States 
unless authorized by the President, who would normally seek Congressional approval 
before deploying troops. This legal question could lead a President to deploy NEST units 
rather than the DOD units even though the DOD units are better trained and would most 
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likely arrive on scene faster than their DOE counterparts. The DOD units have trained 
personnel stationed throughout the country. The DOD units might be closer to the major 
metropolitan areas that terrorists would target than the DOE units that are located at the 
nuclear laboratories in Livermore, California and Los Alamos and Albuquerque, New 
Mexico. 
B. NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK RESPONSE.. 
Despite these efforts, the United States must be ready to respond to a successful 
terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons. The United States has dedicated 
some resources to this objective, but its preparations still fall woefully short of what 
would be needed if a terrorist attacked a city with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
Relatively crude nuclear explosives with a yield of only about 100 tons would be 
powerful enough to annihilate the United States Capitol building or knock down the 
World Trade Center towers in New York City. 113 Even the credible threat of a nuclear or 
radiological attack would quickly overwhelm local and state civilian law enforcement 
capabilities. In the Wild Atom analytical exercise, researchers concluded that traffic 
leaving Manhattan could reach as much as ninety percent above normal volume, without 
New York even specifically mentioned as the target of a terrorist attack. 114 
A terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons could prove catastrophic 
and would require a unified response from various agencies at the federal, state, and local 
levels. 115 Nuclear weapons could cause much more damage than radiological weapons. 
A successful attack with radiological weapons, however, could produce thousands of 
113 Louis Rene Beres, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1979), 45. 
114 CSIS Global Organized Crime Project, Wild Atom, 39. 
115 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy, 38. 
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injured and dead and could require the evacuation of thousands more, not to mention the 
decontamination and disposal of tons of dirt and structures. By comparison, the 
Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion, which was almost entirely a radiological disaster, was 
responsible for an estimated 6,000 deaths and the evacuation of over 100,000 people in 
an area that was not very densely populated. 116 Medical centers in Kiev and Moscow 
diagnosed 28. cases of acute radiation poisoning. Similar.numbers .. of casualties could 
quickly overwhelm even the best medical centers in the United States. 
The good news is that the United States possesses the assets to deal with a 
catastrophic event such as a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack. A covert NBC attack 
against an American target, however, could easily overwhelm local response capabilities, 
resulting in avoidable casualties. 117 The community of first responders across the United 
States is almost totally unprepared to cope with the operational demands of an attack 
involving a weapon of mass destruction. 118 No cities or states possess units similar to 
NEST, even though state and local organizations will be the first to respond and thus 
have the best chance to reduce the effects of an attack. If a terrorist attack with nuclear or 
radiological weapons were to occur, the first units with the needed specialized training 
and equipment would not arrive on the scene until hours after the detonation. 
The greatest opportunity to limit damage from a covert NBC attack, or prevent it 
entirely, exists during the first phases of the crisis. It is important that police and fire 
departments, disaster management agencies, and emergency medical personnel be trained 
116 David R. Marples, "Chemobyl 's Toll After Ten Years: 6,000 and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientist (May/June 1996) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.bullatomicsci.org/issues/ 
1996/mj96/marplesoped.html. 
117 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 300. 
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to identify the warning signs of a nuclear incident and to react appropriately. 
119 State and 
local agencies, however, are neither trained nor equipped to handle the mass casualties 
and general hysteria that could be expected after a terrorist attack with nuclear or 
radiological weapons. 
Because of the lack of resources at the state and local levels, the responsibility to 
respond to a terrorist attackwith nuclear or radiological weapons will fall to the, federal 
government. The United States maintains a number of units that would be called into 
action in the event of a nuclear or radiological attack. In addition to the DOE and DOD 
teams, the other agencies include the Air Force Radiation Assessment Team, Navy and 
Army Radiological Control Teams, and the DOE Atmospheric Release Advisory 
Laboratory located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These teams can bring 
the specially trained personnel and equipment necessary to deal with the medical and 
environmental effects of nuclear and radiological weapons. 
PDD 63 (a Presidential Decision Directive in May 1998) constitutes U.S. 
response against the potential effects of nuclear or radiological terrorism. PDD 63 was 
composed to ensure that the United States government could protect the nation's critical 
infrastructure from international acts that would diminish the abilities of: 
119 Ibid., 303. 
• The Federal Government to perform essential national security missions 
and to ensure the general public health and safety; 
• State and local governments to maintain order and deliver minimum 
essential public services; 
• The private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and 
the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial, and 
transportation services. 120 
120 
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PDD 63 designated the FBI and FEMA as lead federal agencies for response to a 
terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons. PDD 63 also designated various 
federal agencies as lead agencies for specific sectors and functions. The Departments of 
Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, Justice, Health and Human Services (HHS), 
Energy, State, Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), FBI, FEMA, 
and CIA are all assigned specific responsibilities. PDD 63 designates the National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure, Protection, and Counter-terrorism as the person 
responsible for implementing and coordinating the directive. 
While PDD 63 is a step in the right direction, it does not solve the crisis 
management and response problems the United States would face in a nuclear or 
radiological attack. PDD 63 only designates responsibility to federal agencies, which 
might be the last to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. (In some circumstances, 
ill-equipped local and state agencies would probably have to take action before the arrival 
of federal agencies.) The two lead agencies would have to coordinate the efforts of the 
45 federal departments and agencies that have counter-terrorism programs, not to 
mention the state and local agencies that would be involved.121 Even with PDD 63 
twelve federal agencies are responsible for protecting various sectors, raising the risk of 
confusion and disorganization. In the event of an attack, each of these agencies might 
take actions that could hinder the efforts of other agencies. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States has taken steps to protect itself from terrorists armed with 
121 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. 
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nuclear or radiological weapons. The response programs and units in place today, 
however, offer little chance for the United States to counter terrorists armed with nuclear 
or radiological weapons. The United States could develop an effective defense against 
this type of terrorism, but it currently lacks the organization to take advantage of existing 
assets. 
First, the United States should increase research and development investments..in 
programs such as WATS that offer an increased probability oflocating nuclear or 
radiological weapons. Future technological advancements may increase the detection 
capabilities of these types of systems, increasing the chance that response units can be 
directed to a nuclear or radiological weapon before an attack occurs. If an improved 
version ofWATS, or a similar system with increased capabilities, could be developed 
and deployed to every United States border crossing, seaport, airport, and city, and if 
improved sensors could be deployed on vehicles that could cover a greater area such as 
aircraft or satellites, there would be a greater opportunity to locate nuclear or radiological 
weapons before they are detonated. The U.S. priority in responding to nuclear or 
radiological weapon acquisition should be to find and neutralize the weapon before it can 
be used in an attack. 
Second, the response actions of the United States should be simplified, with 
guidelines distributed to all city, county, state, and federal agencies that could be 
involved in nuclear or radiological attack response efforts. PDD 63 should be replaced 
by a new PDD that designates one lead agency to coordinate response efforts in the event 
of terrorism involving nuclear or radiological weapons (or chemical or biological 
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weapons). The FBI and FEMA are effective in their areas of expertise, but they may not 
be well-suited for responding to a terrorist armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
The FBI's ability to conduct investigations regarding conventional domestic 
terrorism is unparalleled in the United States. But it is less clear that the FBI is the 
appropriate lead agency for conducting investigations of terrorist acts that may have been 
committed by foreign powers (states or non-state actors), or that involve unconventional 
weaponry. 122 The 1996 terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the 
recent attack on the USS Cole provide evidence of FBI difficulties in investigating 
terrorist activities overseas. Although the FBI laboratory is the nation's leading 
institution for criminal forensics, it has not been a major center of expertise on weapons 
of mass destruction. 123 The FBI is taking steps to improve its WMD investigation 
capabilities by upgrading the FBI laboratory. The FBI established a HAZMAT Response 
Unit in 1996, but the nuclear material identification and handling capabilities of the DOE 
and DOD still remain superior to that of the FBI. 
FEMA exists almost entirely as an administrative organization that commands 
few resources of its own. FEMA is designed primarily to coordinate responses to natural 
disasters. The large amount of casualties, evacuations, and destruction that could be 
associated with a nuclear or radiological attack could easily be more than FEMA could 
handle. In an emergency, FEMA usually concentrates its efforts on ensuring that relief 
agencies receive the funding and resources required to take care of those affected by the 
disaster. In most emergencies FEMA handles, there may be a few hundred people 
directly affected by the disaster; and there is little need to worry about those who were 
122 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, 297. 
123 Ibid., 298. 
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not injured or left homeless. A terrorist attack could, however, cause several thousand 
casualties, many of which could not be treated at local hospitals which lack facilities to 
treat a large number of radiation casualties. There also might be a requirement for a mass 
evacuation of people out of the radiation danger area, which might involve entire sections 
of the country. 
The U.S. government should develop another PDD that deals. directly with 
responses to terrorist attacks involving WMD. This new PDD should spell out exactly 
what each agency is responsible for, and the number of federal agencies involved should 
be kept to a minimum. The Wild Atom analytical exercise highlighted two major 
deficiencies that could be corrected with the adoption of a new PDD. First, the exercise 
highlighted the lack of a national policy to deal with a nuclear terrorist crisis. PDD 63 
designates responsibility for different sectors, but it does not specify how each lead 
agency will perform its mission. Second, the participants concluded that a single lead 
agency should be designated for nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism. The middle of 
a crisis involving nuclear or radiological weapons in the hands of terrorists is no time to 
wonder who is in charge. 
A new PDD should spell out clearly what local, state, and federal agencies should 
do during a crisis involving nuclear or radiological weapons. This plan should be 
distributed to every law enforcement and emergency response unit in the country. Major 
cities should develop evacuation plans, such as the hurricane evacuation plans used in the 
American southeast. Cities should conduct training drills similar to the earthquake drills 
Tokyo uses to exercise its preparations for the possibility of mass casualties. State 
agencies should possess trained response teams and equipment ready for rapid 
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deployment so the second wave of properly equipped and trained personnel can arrive 
within the first couple of hours after an attack. Federal agencies should know their 
responsibilities, what resources they will have at their disposal, and who will command 
them. 
Both the Congress and the President should develop this detailed contingency 
plan so funding and jurisdictional issues can be settled before the plan is distributed. 
Congress should ensure that funding is made available to local, state, and federal 
governments and require states to meet preparedness guidelines. In the new PDD, the 
possible use of active duty and reserve military assets should be included, so the country 
knows the President may immediately call upon these assets. The President should have 
this authority before an attack since any ambiguity in the midst of a crisis could cost time 
and possibly thousands oflives. 
Training should be required at all levels, including the heads of the federal 
agencies responsible for executing the new PDD. Such training does not take place now. 
Once all the response agencies know exactly what they are supposed to do in case of a 
terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological weapons, more effective training can take 
place. Weaknesses and shortages can then be identified and rectified, and over time the 
ability to respond to terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons will improve. 
A new PDD also should designate the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as the lead 
agent in response to terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. SECDEF is a 
logical choice for this responsibility for three reasons. First, a civilian fills the National 
Coordinator position, allowing military operations to remain under civilian control. 
Second, SECDEF has more experience than other cabinet members in dealing with large 
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organizations during crises. Third, the DOD already possesses much of the best 
infrastructure and equipment necessary to respond to the threat of nuclear or radiological 
terrorism. 
In the event of nuclear or radiological attack, the operational command structure 
would need to direct everything, potentially ranging from CIA covert actions to strikes by 
bombers and missiles. The command structure must be able to set up interdiction 
operations involving ground, sea and air forces, and must have the ability to quickly 
mobilize and move thousands of soldiers and tons of freight. None of these actions can 
happen quickly unless plans have already been drawn up and units have been designated 
to carry them out, with repeated training and exercises to create a readiness to bring the 
plans to life. In this situation, the DOD's capabilities would immediately become 
paramount. 124 
Once designated, the SECDEF should establish a unified command structure that 
would integrate all catastrophic terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning and 
exercises with relevant federal, state, and local authorities. 125 The SECDEF should 
designate the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as the military commander 
responsible for nuclear or radiological terrorism response. The Chief of the NGB 
commands 461 ,000 selected and ready reserve personnel, plus 4 70,000 army and air 
national guardsmen already stationed throughout all 50 states. In addition to these 
approximately 900,000 people, the Air National Guard has approximately 1,180 aircraft 
stationed at 170 installations throughout the nation. 126 SECDEF would also have instant 
124 Carter. Duetch, and Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism." 
125 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. 
126 Data obtained from the Air National Guard website [database on-line]; availablefrom 
http://www.ngb.dtic.mil. 
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access to the resources of the active duty military if needed to respond to a nuclear or 
radiological attack. 
The SECDEF also is a logical choice for National Coordinator because of the 
assets and capabilities of the military. Much of the military is already trained in personal 
radiation defense and knows how to use radiation detection equipment, and the National 
Guard and Reserve units could easily receive this training. The military also has medical .. 
personnel that have been trained in treating radiation casualties. Many military hospitals 
are located on bases that can be closed off so casualties could more easily be isolated. A 
few strategically located military hospitals could be designated radiation treatment 
centers. Facilities at selected military hospitals could be upgraded so they could treat a 
larger number of radiation victims. 
In addition to having some capabilities for treating the casualties of a nuclear or 
radiological attack, the military possesses the logistical infrastructure required to 
transport response personnel to the scene while evacuating others out of harm's way. 
The military has the trucks, airplanes, and ships that could move thousands of people 
quickly. The military has people trained in crowd control, law enforcement, and security, 
which would all be importa~t in augmenting local and state authorities. Moreover, the 
military has its own intelligence networks that could work with other government 
intelligence agencies to avert or respond to a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack. 
The SECDEF is the only cabinet member that has access to the vast types and 
numbers of resources required to conduct an adequate response to nuclear or radiological 
terrorism. Keeping civilian control of military emergency response units is important, 
and the SECDEF is the only civilian federal agency head (besides the President) that has 
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control of the assets required to respond to a terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological 
weapons. A new PDD should designate DOD under SECDEF as the lead agency in 
nuclear and radiological (or chemical or biological) terrorism response, and the SECDEF 
should appoint the Chief of the NGB as the military officer responsible for ensuring that 




The United States must improve its capability to defend against terrorists armed 
with nuclear or radiological weapons. This thesis has examined four commonly 
recommended strategies for countering terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological 
weapons; identifying terrorists that pose a genuine risk of acquiring nuclear materials, 
securing nuclear material and interdicting smuggling, deterrence, and responding to 
terrorists already in possession of nuclear or radiological weapons. Since the United 
States has neither a infinite amount of time or money to spend on the problem of nuclear 
or radiological terrorism, each of these recommended strategies must be evaluated based 
upon their positive and negative aspects to formulate a plan the United States can quickly 
and effectively implement. 
A. THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IS CHANGING AND THE UNITED 
STATES MUST BE PREPARED TO COUNTER NUCLEAR AND 
RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, retired U.S. Marine Corps 
General Anthony Zinni warned that "we will eventually see a weapon of mass destruction 
used in a terrorist attack" and added that "we had better start thinking about how we're 
going to be prepared for that, because we're woefully unprepared for that event. And 
that's inevitable, as this asymmetry continues."127 United States Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen offered a similar assessment when interviewed on the television program 
Meet the Press. "The likelihood of an attack on American soil, using either a chemical, 
biological, or indeed, a nuclear weapon, is quite, not only possible, but probable."128 
127 Zinni quoted in James P. Pinkerton, "We Face War By Terrorism, Ready Or Not," Long Island 
Newsday, 26 October 2000, 45. 
128 Cohen quoted in Ibid. 
73 
The face of terrorism seems to be changing. Recent large-scale terrorist attacks, 
otherwise known as super-terrorism, exemplify a trend that could lead toward terrorist 
attacks with nuclear or radiological weapons. Recently terrorists such as Timothy 
MeV eigh have conducted operations that seem to be directed toward causing as many 
casualties as possible. Me Veigh could have destroyed that building in Oklahoma City 
and still minimized the number of casualties, but he chose to conduct an attack that seems 
to have been oriented toward maximizing the number of casualties. If maximizing the 
number of casualties may now be the goal of some terrorists, this desire could lead them 
to tum to nuclear or radiological weapons. 
Another trend that could prove to be dangerous for the United States is the 
possible breakdown of nuclear materials security in Russia. If economic conditions for 
the masses remain stagnant, or continue to decline, the questionable state of security 
throughout Russia's nuclear infrastructure could decline as well. There is already 
evidence that both terrorists and states that sponsor terrorism are 
attempting to obtain nuclear materials smuggled from FSU nations. Customs officers in 
the former Soviet republic of Uzbekistan intercepted ten lead-lined containers filled with 
enough radioactive materials to make dozens of crude weapons. The materials were 
apparently being smuggled at the behest ofUsama bin Laden. 129 In addition, agents from 
Iran (a state the United States has designated as a sponsor of terrorism) in Turkey, 
Kazakhstan, and elsewhere are known to have tried to buy non-fissile but radioactive 
material originating from the FSU. 130 
129 Ibid., 45. 
130 Laqueur, "Postmodem Terrorism," 30. 
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Only a group of Chechen rebels that was dominated by a charismatic leader, 
Shamyl Basayev, that almost single-handedly conceived the attack, has used nuclear 
materials in a terrorist operation. Some dismiss these acts as only evidence that irrational 
actors do not comply with normal terrorist activity. The casualties and effects resulting 
from even a single terrorist nuclear or radiological attack, however, could be devastating 
to the United States. Even if a terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly 
chemicals, or nuclear or radiological materials succeeded only partially, it could 
profoundly affect the entire nation. 131 While it may be true that only one terrorist group 
has to date used nuclear materials in an attack, the United States cannot afford to suffer 
the consequences of even a single nuclear or radiological terrorist attack. 
B. THE UNITED STATES MUST PRIORITIZE COUNTER-TERRORISM 
STRATEGIES TO BE IMPROVED 
This thesis has examined four strategies the United States employs to defend 
against nuclear and radiological terrorism and has provided recommendations on how to 
improve each strategy. In a perfect world, the United States could promptly improve its 
counter-terrorism efforts in all areas. An immediate across-the-board defense 
improvement is not a realistic option, however. The United States must decide what 
strategies offer the best prospects for defending against nuclear and radiological terrorism 
and invest more resources to improve those areas. 
The highest priority for United States counter-terrorism policy should be to 
improve intelligence capabilities, especially in human intelligence (HUMINT). 
Terrorists usually depend on remaining hidden to conceal their planning and actions prior 
to an attack and to escape capture after an attack. This behavior would be especially 
131 National Conunission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. 
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probable if terrorists were going to use nuclear or radiological weapons since there would 
presumably be more time, effort and risk involved to acquire nuclear materials. The best 
way to protect against terrorist attacks is to penetrate the veil of secrecy that surrounds 
terrorist organizations and thereby gain access to knowledge of terrorist intentions. Only 
a small number of terrorists may possess both the desire and capability to acquire nuclear 
materials, so the intelligence community should focus its efforts against these select. few 
groups to improve detection of a possible nuclear or radiological attack. 
The second priority for the United States should be to improve response 
capabilities against terrorists that have already acquired nuclear or radiological weapons. 
Despite concerted intelligence, nuclear material security, and deterrence efforts the 
United States may still face terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
Specifically, the United States should concentrate on improving interception capabilities 
and crisis response organization. The United States must improve its capability to disable 
nuclear or radiological weapons before they are detonated. PDD 63 should be replaced 
with a new crisis response plan that designates the DOD as the lead agency in a nuclear 
or radiological attack response. 
Implementing improvements in intelligence and response efforts could be 
relatively inexpensive, and certainly would be less expensive than dealing with the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack from terrorists. Two of the major 
improvements are administrative changes that could be accomplished quickly by 
changing current policy. First, the United States should change its counter-terrorism 
policy to allow law enforcement and intelligence agents to make deals with terrorists if 
such deals could lead to the discovery of additional information making possible arrests 
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of terrorist leaders or stopping future attacks. Second, adopting a new PDD would 
improve the capabilities of specialized nuclear emergency response units since a wide 
variety of military assets could quickly be called into action. The extra expenses to 
improve intelligence and response efforts (in areas such as additional equipment and 
personnel, research and development, and increased training) would be justified by the 
improved counter-terrorism capabilities the United States would acquire. 
Deterrence and securing nuclear materials should be lower priorities for the 
United States, though efforts in these areas should not be reduced. The United States 
already has enough nuclear and conventional military power to practice punitive 
deterrence against terrorists. Improving intelligence and response capabilities would 
allow the United States also to improve its modified deterrence capabilities. Securing 
nuclear materials is obviously important to defend against nuclear or radiological 
terrorism, but the United States can work in cooperation with other nations to improve 
security in nuclear facilities throughout the FSD. "Loose nukes" and "brain drain" from 
Russia are threats to numerous countries, so the United States could seek arrangements to 
share the cost of programs such as the Material Protection Control & Accounting, 
International Science and Technolqgy Center, and Second Line of Defense with other 
governments. Washington could then dedicate funding to other capabilities that the 
United States must improve on its own. 
C. THE UNITED STATES MUST IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE AGAINST 
NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM ON AN ACCELERATED 
BASIS 
Some members of the United States Congress have recognized the need to 
improve counter-terrorism capabilities, but thus far progress has been slow. Senators Jon 
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Kyl and Dianne Feinstein have sponsored a bill that would require the president to devise 
a long-term research and development initiative aimed at developing new technologies 
for countering terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The 
bill also would require the CIA to prepare a report on the advisability of current 
guidelines restricting the recruitment ofterrorist informantsY2 If passed into law, both 
of these recommendations would enhance America's ability to combat nuclear or 
radiological terrorism. 
The United States faces two limitations in its efforts to protect against terrorists 
armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. The first limitation is a possible lack of 
time to prepare for an attack. Terrorists may already possess nuclear or radiological 
weapons. Focusing improved intelligence capabilities against those terrorists that may 
attempt to acquire nuclear or radiological weapons could provide a better assessment of 
the threat. 
The second limitation is resources. The United States cannot afford to spend 
billions of dollars on programs that may not improve capabilities to defend against 
nuclear or radiological terrorism. The United States should focus resources primarily in 
the areas that will offer the greatest improvements in defending against terrorists armed 
with nuclear or radiological weapons. Though better capabilities in any of the four 
strategies examined in this thesis would enhance counter-terrorism efforts, improved 
intelligence and response capabilities could offer the most valuable means to strengthen 
America's defenses against terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons. 
132 Vernon Loeb, "Senator Presses For Bill To Combat Terrorism," Washington Post, 3 October 2000, 23. 
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